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
 
ABSTRACT 
The 1920 Svalbard Treaty conferred full and absolute sovereignty on 
Norway but paradoxically limited that sovereignty by conferring on states 
party to the treaty equal enjoyment and liberty of access provisions on 
Svalbard and in its territorial waters. Whether these provisions now 
extend to geographic areas adjacent to Svalbard’s territorial sea—
specifically to Svalbard’s oil-rich continental shelf and abundant fishing 
stock of the superjacent waters of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—is 
a matter of considerable debate. Norway repudiates the dynamic legal 
extension of the Svalbard Treaty to these geographic areas, which post-
date the treaty; other Arctic stakeholders, notably Russia, disagree. This 
Article concentrates on the problematic meaning of full and absolute yet 
qualified sovereignty within the context of the Svalbard Treaty. Focusing 
on the factual and historical circumstances, or effectivités pertaining to 
the archipelago’s 400 year human history are of essential but limited use 
given competing historical narratives. Instead, this Article concentrates on 
the historical and legal development of the concept of terra nullius, a term 
more elusive than commonly thought, and the ways in which states 
historically made use of that concept to forward territorializing interests 
over Svalbard’s newly emerging resources, even when pronouncing or 
professing interest in shared or condominium-like resource management 
arrangements. In an age of rapid ice melt in the cryosphere, accompanied 
by emergent technology and increasing access to previously unavailable 
or uncontemplated resources, Svalbard’s extended geographical area 
challenges global governance regimes and presents a cautionary tale 
about territorial temptation in the High Arctic’s diminishing global 
commons.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2015, Russia’s deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin paid an 
unscheduled visit to Norway’s High Arctic archipelago, Svalbard. His 
presence sparked an angry response from Norway, whose Foreign 
Ministry had been caught unaware. Norway, like other western countries, 
had banned him from entry as a personal punishment for his role in 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine.1 
Russia’s Foreign Ministry lampooned the Norwegian sanction as 
‘inexplicable and absurd’.2 While sovereign states are free to engage in 
 
 
 1. See Thomas Nilsen, Strong Norwegian Reaction to Rogozin’s Svalbard Tour, BARENTS 
OBSERVER, Apr. 18, 2015, http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2015/04/strong-norwegian-reaction-
rogozins-svalbard-tour-18-04. 
 2. See ‘Inexplicable and Absurd’—Russia Blasts Norway’s Overreaction on Official Svalbard 
Visit, RT, Apr. 20, 2015, http://rt.com/politics/251209-russia-rogozin-svalbard-ministry/; Trudde 
Pettersen, Norway has no right to stop anyone from visiting Svalbard, BARENTS OBSERVER, Apr. 21, 
2015, http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2015/04/norway-has-no-right-stop-anyone-visiting-svalbard 
-21-04. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/7
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such a retorsion, Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard fell into a special 
category established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty (Spitsbergen Treaty).
3
 
Unlike other unclaimed territories, which historically have been acquired 
by discovery, effective or symbolic occupation,
4
 or by force,
5
 Norway’s 
sovereignty over Svalbard was conferred on it by this treaty. The treaty 
contained “equal enjoyment” and “equal liberty of access” provisions for 
nationals of states parties to the convention,
6
 which includes Russia.
7
 
These provisions restricted Norway’s sovereignty and the ideas of 
conferring and restricting sovereignty are the treaty’s most unusual 
features.  
Rogozin said bad weather prompted his unannounced stop-over, but he 
easily could have claimed, as head of the State Commission for Arctic 
Development, that he wanted to visit the historical Russian mining 
community at Barentsburg,
8
 not that Russia conceded he needed any 
reason to visit.
9
 Others sensed a more troubling explanation. Analysts 
called it a “deliberate provocation,”10 obliquely reinforced by Rogozin’s 
 
 
 3. Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British Overseas Dominions and Sweden Concerning 
Spitsbergen Signed in Paris 9th February 1920, http://www.sysselmannen.no/Documents/ 
Sysselmannen_dok/English/Legacy/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf [hereinafter The Svalbard 
Treaty]. Prior to 1920, when the treaty was signed, the archipelago was commonly referred to as 
Spitsbergen; when the treaty came into effect in 1925, the King of Norway proclaimed the islands as 
Svalbard. This article maintains that distinction and will refer to the archipelago as Spitsbergen when 
discussing events prior to 1920/1925 and Svalbard when discussing events after 1925. 
 4. See generally James Simsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title to Terra Nullius, 53 POL. SCI. 
Q. 111 (1938) (discussing transition from symbolic to occupational claims of title to terra nullius). 
 5. See 1 William Blackstone, Introduction to COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 
§ IV, 105 (1765), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_intro.asp (discussing acquisition 
of conquered or ceded colonies that were unclaimed but inhabited). 
 6. See The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2 (“Ships and nationals of all the High 
Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified”), 
and art. 3 (“The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and 
entry for any reason”). 
 7. Fourteen states were original signatories. The Soviet Union and Germany signed the 
agreement in 1924 and 1925, respectively. Currently, forty-two states have ratified the treaty. They 
include: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. 
 8. See supra note 2.  
 9. See Pettersen, supra note 2 (quoting Russian Foreign Ministry view that Oslo has “no legal 
grounds” against Rogozin’s visit). 
 10. Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, Norway Summons Ambassador After Banned Russian Visits 
Svalbard, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/norway-summons-ambassador-
after-banned-russian-visits-svalbard-1429536060 (citing Norwegian foreign policy researcher, Jakub 
Godzimirski); Eirik Palm, Uønsket gjest dukket opp: “Ӕdda bӕdda” fra Rogozin [Unwanted Guest 
Appeared: “Ӕdda bӕdda” from Rogozin], SVALBARDPOSTEN (Nor.), Apr. 19, 2015, http://svalbard 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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statement that “the Arctic is a Russian Mecca.”11 Rogozin set foot on turf 
Russia once claimed as a preferential interest. But Bolshevik predecessors 
traded away any future sovereign claim during the Soviet Union’s 
turbulent formative years in the 1920s.
12
 Perhaps Rogozin wanted to 
spitefully grudge Norway what Russia could not itself secure,
13
 or worse, 
perhaps his unannounced presence suggested an interest in Svalbard that 
Russia never fully relinquished: “Russia has begun to understand its place, 
its borders and its interests,” Rogozin said after the visit; referencing 
Crimea’s annexation in 2014, he continued: “We saw something historic 
take place last year. Russia’s territorial integrity was restored. This year, 
we are casting our glance elsewhere. We are taking a closer look at the 
development of the Arctic. The two things are the same.”14 
Rogozin’s reputation for bluster15 is more easily set aside than the 
timing of his visit. The month before, Russia’s ambassador to Norway 
filed a sharp diplomatic protest when Norway began soliciting bids to 
develop areas of the Barents Sea for energy exploration adjacent to 
Svlabard’s territorial waters.16 Russia claimed Norway’s solicitation 
violated the peculiar conditions placed on sovereign rule by the Svalbard 
 
 
posten.no/index.php?page=vis_nyhet&NyhetID=5799&sok=1 (citing Nansen Institutt’s Jørgen Holten 
Jørgensen’s view that the Russians were probing Norway’s reaction to see how far they could go). 
 11. Steffen Pedersen Øberg, Rogozin: “Arktis er det russiske Mekka” [Rogozin: “The Arctic is 
Russian Mecca”], AFTENPOSTEN (Nor.), Apr. 20, 2015, http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/ 
Rogozin-Arktis-er-det-russiske-Mekka-7987876.html (quoting Rogozin). 
 12. Official Soviet accession to the treaty “without any conditions and reservations,” including 
Norway’s sovereignty over Bear Island, occurred on May 7, 1935, although the Soviet pledge “not to 
advance objections” was recorded on February 16, 1924. See A.N. VYLEGZHANIN & V.K. ZILANOV, 
SPITSBERGEN: LEGAL REGIME OF ADJACENT MARINE AREAS 24, 25 (W.E. Butler ed. and trans., 2007) 
[hereinafter VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV]. 
 13. See generally Aesop’s fable, The Dog in the Manger.  
 14. Erik Lund, When Dmitry Rogozin Speaks, People Worry, THE ARCTIC J. (Green.), May 7, 
2015, http://arcticjournal.com/politics/1562/when-dmitry-rogozin-speaks-people-worry (quoting 
Rogozin). 
 15. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia's NATO Envoy, Big on Bluster, Modifies His Tone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27iht-moscow.4.15691237.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (labeling Rogozin blustery); Emily Gertz, Russian Bluster Aside, What Will 
Become of the ISS, POPULAR SCI., May 19, 2014, http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/russian-
bluster-aside-what-will-become-iss) (citing Rogozin’s threat to end cooperation on the International 
Space Station); Roger McDermott, Russian Military Modernization: Rogozin Promises a ‘Nuclear 
Surprise’, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, Oct. 7, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/ 
?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42926&cHash=419d2173f0771cbff161b9709d5a39a7#.VXG6vc9Viko 
(noting Rogozin’s “nuclear surprise” for adversaries following military modernization). 
 16. See Rolf Stange, Russia Protests against Norwegian Oil Development in the Barents Sea, 
SPITSBERGEN/SVALBARD ARCTIC BLOG, May 12, 2015, http://www.spitsbergen-svalbard.com/2015/ 
05/12/russia-protests-against-norwegian-oil-development-in-the-barents-sea.html?lang=en. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/7
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Treaty.
17
 Implicit in the Russian view is Norway’s provocation, which 
upsets a relatively quiet status quo arrangement in a bid to territorialize 
new resources that changing circumstances now allow.
18
 
This Article investigates the dispute over Svalbard’s sovereignty. It 
takes the position that rapid ice melt and conditions of global warming, 
together with technological advances and increasingly accessible 
resources, have awakened competing interests over the legal regime that 
both confers on Norway full and absolute sovereignty and limits that 
sovereignty by establishing equal access and non-discrimination rights for 
all states parties to the treaty. Understanding how this paradoxical 
arrangement came about, bearing some similarity to the Mandates System 
under the League of Nations,
19
 better informs of the challenges facing its 
application and High Arctic governance in the unfolding age of rapidly 
receding ice. With technological changes making more accessible and safe 
offshore oil development, pressure increases to open up new unexplored 
areas to replace barren North Sea oil fields; with rapid ice melt, prospects 
enhance to explore and exploit the High Arctic’s massive oil and gas 
reserves;
20
 with commercial fishing fleets competing world-wide for 
diminishing stocks, Svalbard’s plentiful waters present an enticing lure. 
These factors, taken together, present obvious territorial temptations.
21
 
 
 
 17. See Alf Bjarne Johnsen, Russland Protesterer Mot Oljeboring I Svalbard-Sonen: UD Mottok 
Skarp Note Fra Moskva [Russia Protects against Oil Drilling in the Svalbard Zone], VG NYHETER 
(Nor.), May 2, 2015, http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/norsk-politikk/russland-protesterer-mot-
oljeboring-i-svalbard-sonen/a/23444540/. 
 18. See Katarzyna Bozena Zysk, Russian Military Power and the Arctic, EU-RUSSIA CENTRE 82 
(2008), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=99789 (discussing a 
widespread Russian conviction that Norway’s Svalbard policy aims to drive Russia away from the 
archipelago and adjacent waters). 
 19. See GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY: FROM TERRA NULLIUS TO NORWEGIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY 50 (1995) [hereinafter ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY]; Torkel Opsahl, Norwegian 
Dependencies, Particularly Spitsbergen and the European Communities, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN 
ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 179 (M.E. Bathurst et al. eds., 1972). 
 20. See 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the 
Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID= 
1980#.VbJqDvlViko (projecting undiscovered, technically recoverable energy reserves above the 
Arctic Circle).  
 21. A giant 2011 discovery of oil and gas deposits in the Johan Castberg sector of Norway’s 
Barents Sea continental shelf has turned “this huge area into a hotspot” for exploration; several dry 
wells in the Norwegian Sea have diverted oil company attention and enthusiasm elsewhere, certainly 
toward the High North; reports of diminishing expectation for oil recovery in the North Sea abound, 
but supergiant strikes on the Utsira High in 2010 and 2011 (renamed Johan Sverdrup), a mature part of 
the North Sea, may rank as Norway’s largest discovery ever, focusing renewed interest in Norwegian 
North Sea oil prospects. See Halfdan Carstens, Small Is Also Beautiful, 10 GEOEXPRO, no. 6, at 20 
(2013), available at http://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2014/01/small-is-also-beautiful. The phrase 
‘territorial temptation’ is taken from Bernard Oxman. See generally Bernard H. Oxman, The 
Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM J. INT’L L. 830 (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Discussions about the complexities of Svalbard’s sovereignty are not 
new, but they tend to focus, and properly so, on the applicability of that 
regime structure to the geographical regions beyond Svalbard’s territorial 
waters and not on the treaty’s antecedents. These antecedents add texture 
and meaning to the peculiar and paradoxical shared resource arrangement 
the Svalbard Treaty created. They help to explain why current differences 
regarding the treaty’s seaward extension will not be resolved easily, and 
probably not without Norway’s further accommodation of competing 
interests. They also shed light on state practices that arise in status quo 
arrangements and how those practices provide second-best rewards when 
not interpreted as creeping jurisdictional threats to secure sovereign 
control. By delving into the history of Svalbard, a deeper understanding of 
Svalbard’s constructed terra nullius status obtains along with the vagaries 
of that phrase, which also help to explain the peculiar equivocations 
reflected in the Svalbard Treaty. Placing current discussions in a more 
global and historical context also enhances this Article’s assertion that 
capable states have long displayed territorial temptations regarding the 
resources of the archipelago when they have become apparent and 
accessible. But when not able to assert sovereignty over this harsh land 
void of indigenous population, history reveals that states created their own 
de facto course of dealing—which maximized parochial interests 
regarding resource extraction—sometimes in the name of common use, 
sometimes in the form of a quasi–condominium arrangement—if only to 
preclude any other individual state’s perfection of sovereign interests over 
Svalbard. Preclusive interests again are on display as Norway seemingly 
seeks to test the limits of its ultimate parochial design to perfect its 
sovereignty over resources adjacent to Svalbard’s territorial sea. Its efforts 
give rise to the central question of this Article: Does Norway’s grant of 
sovereignty in the 1920 Svalbard Treaty extend to the modern maritime 
zones adjacent to Svalbard’s territorial sea?  
In addition to this introduction, this Article proceeds as follows: Part II 
will discuss increasing tensions in the High Arctic brought about by rapid 
ice melt and perceived ambiguities in the Svalbard Treaty, conditions that 
motivate Norway’s contested newest claims. Part III will discuss the 
current dispute among the principals. Part IV will discuss the meaning of 
‘full and absolute sovereignty’ as presented in the Svalbard Treaty. Part V 
will review competing historical narratives regarding the discovery of 
Spitsbergen and the challenges associated with historical claims based on 
factual circumstances or effectivités. Part VI will review the resurgent 
interest in Spitsbergen following the whaling epoch, which resulted in a 
proto-commons agreement. Parts VII and VIII will discuss evolving 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/7
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constructions of the terra nullius idea concentrating on the important 
views of Robert Lansing and the discussions over resources acquisition in 
Polynesia, which informed and paralleled Svalbard discussions and led to 
the 1856 Guano Island Act. This law introduced a means of securing 
parochial resource interests while ambiguously avoiding a claim of 
sovereign authority. Part X concentrates on the early twentieth century 
attempts to establish Spitsbergen as a condominium arrangement. Part XI 
notes the subtle and effective Norwegian diplomatic attempts at the Paris 
Peace Conference to undo condominium considerations, which led to the 
formation of the current regime for Svalbard as expressed by the Svalbard 
Treaty. Part XI draws conclusions about the historical attempts to 
territorialize Svalbard and assesses prospects for the archipelago’s future 
mineral and living resource exploitation. 
II. INCREASING TENSIONS OVER RESOURCES AND THE DYNAMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SVALBARD TREATY  
The seaward extension of the territorial rule allowing for control over 
resources conforms to a basic principle of the law of the sea: The land 
dominates the sea.
22
 Sovereignty over the riches of an archipelago’s 
continental shelf is legally “an emanation from and an automatic adjunct 
of the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State.”23 Norway claims it owns 
Svalbard’s continental shelf because it reigns over Svalbard; Russia claims 
Svalbard’s sovereignty is conferred by mutual agreement and that the 
unusual equitable and non-discriminatory provisions bestowed by that 
authority extend to the administration, ownership, and exploitation of 
resources off Svalbard’s coast, which (presumably) also must be equally 
beneficial to the states parties to the Svalbard Treaty. Scholars deem this 
interpretation ‘dynamic’; this dynamism views the treaty as an all-
encompassing package solution, whereby Norway’s sovereignty hinged 
originally on the understanding that other states parties “retained certain 
terra nullius rights.”24 If Norway’s treaty-conferred rights were to expand, 
other parties’ rights would, too.  
 
 
 22. Grisbardana Case (Nor. v. Swed.), 11 R.I.A.A. 155, 159 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909) (noting the 
fundamental principle “‘tant’tant ancient que modern’ that ‘le territoire maritime est un dépendance 
necessaire d’un territoire terrestre’”); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 51, ¶ 96 (Feb. 20) (the “land dominates the sea”). 
 23. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Gr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. 3, 36, ¶ 86 (Dec. 19). 
 24. See, e.g., Sarah Wolf, Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, Their Status Under International Law and 
Current and Future Dispute Scenarios 2, at 18 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper FG 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A. Signs of Cooperation 
Svalbard’s maritime surroundings have been disputed for decades, 
although two principal stakeholders—Norway and Russia—have been 
fairly content to avoid direct confrontation over the Treaty’s ‘long-arm 
reach,’25 absent a pressing need to resolve ambiguities and contested 
interpretations,
26
 until now. 
Although vastly different in terms of size, population, and military 
strength, Norway and Russia closely compete in oil and gas industries. 
Both countries are among the world’s largest net exporters of energy; and 
both have major stakes in Europe: Norway supplies 21 percent of Europe’s 
natural gas; Russia is the EU’s leading supplier of oil and gas; a 
Norwegian concession was the first to strike offshore oil in 1969 and 
production has since that time moved from the North Sea into the 
Norwegian Sea, off the midsection of the country, and most recently into 
the High North reaches of the Barents Sea.
27
 Russia historically focused 
oil production on land but shifted policy in the mid-1980s and now 
decidedly is rotating its industry into High North waters.
28
 Despite its 
smaller size, Norway benefits from extensive experience in offshore 
production and a more coherent policy,
29
 making it a formidable and 
enviable competitor. Moving geographically in clockwise and counter-
clockwise directions across the northern expanse, these energy-producing 
titans are increasingly setting sights on availing but formerly out of reach 
resources surrounding Svalbard. 
For forty years, an offshore border dispute in the Barents Sea between 
the island chains of Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya (the so-called “Loop 
Hole”) complicated Norwegian-Russian relations. Where and how to draw 
 
 
2, No. 2, 2013), available at http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/ 
WP_Wolf_2_2013.pdf.  
 25. See generally Peter T. Ørebech, The ‘Long-Arm’ Reach of the Svalbard Treaty?, EXPRESSO 
(July 2015), http://works.bepress.com/peter_orebech/1. 
 26. See Robin Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard, in 
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 593 (Myron H. Nordquist, Tomas 
H. Heidar & John Norton Moore eds., 2010) [hereinafter Churchill & Ulfstein]. 
 27. Jeremy Cresswell, Norway Claims First Strike, OILCITY, http://www.oilcity.co.uk/home/ 
article.asp?pageid=470 (detailing the Ocean Viking strike by Phillips Petroleum in the Ekofisk field on 
December 23, 1969). See also, Norway Supplies More than 20% of Europe's Natural Gas Needs, US 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., May 16, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16311 (citing 
that Norway supplies 21 percent of total European natural gas); and Energy Production and Imports, 
EUROSTAT (2015), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_ 
and_imports (citing Russia as the EU’s main supplier of crude oil and natural gas (and solid fuels)).  
 28. See Arild Moe, Russian and Norwegian Petroleum Strategies in the Barents Sea, 1 ARCTIC 
REV. L. & POL. 225, 226 (2010). 
 29. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol15/iss1/7
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that line stymied development of an area of open sea the size of Florida, 
containing under its subsoil an estimated 39 billion barrels of oil.
30
 But in 
2010, the countries came to terms on a compromise delimitation, opening 
up the prospect of offshore development.
31
 Russia emphasized, however, 
that the accord did not resolve the two countries’ disagreement over the 
waters around Svalbard.
32
 The dispute was not purely bilateral. Voices in 
the European Parliament questioned whether the delimitation improperly 
divvied up a portion of Svalbard’s fishery resource belonging to neither 
state.
33
  
B. A Dramatic Deterioration 
Despite long-standing cooperation in the Norwegian and Barents Seas 
through the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission, and more recent 
ventures, including a 2012 agreement to explore jointly frontier areas, and 
a Russian stake in a license in the Barents Sea operated by Norway’s state-
owned Statoil, relations deteriorated dramatically when Norway offered its 
twenty-third licensing round in January 2015.
34
 This round opened up 
fifty-seven blocks for exploration, thirty-four of which were in formerly 
disputed waters with Russia,
35
 including, controversially, three blocks in 
waters offshore from Svalbard.
36
 Russia reiterated long-simmering 
objections pertaining to these waters: It claimed Norway violated the 
 
 
 30. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia and Norway Agree on Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/world/europe/16russia.html?_r=0. 
 31. See Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Sept. 15, 
2010, available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_ 
engelsk.pdf. 
 32. See Lotta Numminen, A History and Functioning of the Spitsbergen Treaty, in THE 
SPITSBERGEN TREATY: MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC 7, 13 (Diana Wallis & Steward 
Arnold eds., 2011). 
 33. See Andreas Raspotnik & Andreas Østhagen, From Seal Ban to Svalbard-The European 
Parliament Engages in Arctic Matters, THE ARCTIC INST., Mar. 10, 2014, www.thearcticinstitute.org/ 
2014/03from-seal-ban-to-svalbard-european.html (noting a Polish parliamentarian’s inquiry about a 
European Commission claim for compensation). The European Union is not party to the Treaty but 
bases its interests on the principle of “conferral of competence” owing to certain shared competences 
some of its member states have involving Svalbard. See id. 
 34. Exclusive rights extended to companies for oil licenses are regulated by a designate block 
system operated by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. See generally Exploration Policy, 
NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM, http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/exploration/exploration-policy/ (detailing 
licensing position for the Norwegian continental shelf as of April 2015). 
 35. See Atle Staalesen, Norway Offers 34 Arctic Blocks along Russian Border, BARENTS 
OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2015, http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2015/01/norway-offers-34-arctic-
blocks-along-russian-border-20-01. 
 36. See Trude Pettersen, Russia Protests Drilling in Svalbard Zone, BARENTS OBSERVER, May 5, 
2015, http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/2015/05/russia-protests-drilling-svalbard-zone-05-05.  
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Svalbard Treaty by offering drilling opportunities in those three blocks; 
that Svalbard has its own continental shelf subject to inter-temporal 
interpretations of the non-discrimination provisions of the 1920 Treaty; 
and that Norway obdurately refused to negotiate.
37
 Spain and Iceland share 
the view that the equal access and non-discrimination provisions of the 
treaty restrict Norway’s sovereign rights off Svalbard’s coast, and 
periodically have indicated they will refer the question to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).
38
 Norway, in turn, claimed Svalbard has an 
undifferentiated continental shelf (notwithstanding the general legal view 
that islands, save for uninhabitable rock outcroppings, generate their own 
continental shelves);
39
 that the shelf extends from its mainland and around 
and past Svalbard,
40
 save for the treaty’s exception of Svalbard’s 
“territorial waters;”41 that Norway does not need to negotiate rights with 
any country as its rights are secured under the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention;
42
 and that the Svalbard Treaty’s equal treatment provisions 
have no applicability beyond the treaty’s original scope,43 which limits the 
treaty’s application solely to the land and territorial waters.44 In line with 
 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Torbjørn Pedersen, Conflict and Order in Svalbard Waters, 187 (Apr. 2008) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Tromsø) [hereinafter Pedersen, Conflict and Order] (noting Spain’s 1986 
and Iceland’s 1994 indications to refer the question to the ICJ); Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard 
Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 
339, 345 (2006) [hereinafter Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy] (noting Iceland and 
Russia most vigorously object to Norway’s view); Nkeiru Scotcher, The Sovereignty Dilemma, THE 
SPITSBERGEN TREATY: MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ARCTIC 21, 22 (Diana Wallis & Stewart 
Arnold eds., 2011). 
 39. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 567 (pointing out how UNCLOS art. 121 regards 
every island, apart from uninhabitable rock, as having a continental shelf). 
 40. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 344 (summarizing 
the Norwegian view that the continental shelf of Svalbard is “physically and inherently one continuous 
seabed adjacent to the Norwegian coastline.”). The Norwegian Foreign Ministry compares Svalbard’s 
geological situation to the Shetland Islands on Great Britain’s continental shelf, or Novaya Zemlya and 
Franz Josef Land on Russia’s continental shelf. See also The Continental Shelf—Questions and 
Answers, UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENTET, REGJERINGEN.NO, Oct. 30, 2009, available at https:// 
www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/the-continental-shelf---questions-and-an/id583774/ [hereinafter 
Utenriksdepartementet] (noting that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry compares Svalbard’s geological 
situation to the Shetland Islands on Great Britain’s continental shelf, or Novaya Zemlya and Franz 
Josef Land on Russia’s continental shelf). 
 41. See The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2 (“Ships and nationals of all High Contracting 
Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and 
in their territorial waters.”). 
 42. See Pettersen, supra note 36. 
 43. Øystein Jensen & Svein Vigeland Rottem, The Politics of Security and International Law in 
Norway's Arctic Waters, 46 (236) POLAR REC. 73, 79 (2010).  
 44. See D.H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around 
Svalbard, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 373, 374, 380 (2009) (noting they are the only two spaces 
mentioned in the Treaty). 
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the famous S.S. Lotus dictum, Norway argues that restrictions on its 
sovereignty are not to be presumed;
45
 and that restricting sovereignty 
conferred by treaties must conform to the literal and ordinary meaning of 
the treaty, which has no ambulatory, dynamic, or inter-temporal 
significance.
46
 Instead, the treaty set in stone only those legal interests 
secured by its express terms and cannot be enlarged imaginatively to 
trump subsequent developments in the law of the sea even though its 
fundamental intent and purpose was to secure an “equitable regime” for 
“peaceful utilization” based on equal enjoyment and non-discrimination.47 
In line with Lord Asquith’s reasoning in the famous Abu Dhabi 
Arbitration (1951), “it would be a most artificial refinement to read back 
into [an agreement] the implications of a doctrine” not established at the 
time of its creation.
48
 
Some experts think there is too much at stake not to settle the dispute; 
others see Russia and Norway on a collision course.
49
 Either way, the 
waters off Svalbard highlight increasing tensions regarding the legal status 
of the archipelago and its surroundings, making it an emerging centerpiece 
of a new global power race for influence and resources.
50
 “For anyone 
interested in geopolitics,” noted the president of the Norwegian Scientific 
Academy for Polar Research, “this is the region to follow in years to 
come.”51  
 
 
 45. See id. at 379 (citing the 1999 Norwegian Ministry of Justice White Paper); see also 
Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 565–66 (noting the opinion of Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
consultant Carl August Fleischer).  
 46. See UTENRIKSDEPARTEMENTET, supra note 40, at 7 (rejecting any connection between 
Norway’s outer continental shelf submission and the Svalbard Treaty). See also Anderson, supra note 
44, at 380 (summarizing Norway’s view, which differs from the author’s view). 
 47. See The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3, at preamble and art. 1.  
 48. Petroleum Dev. Ltd. V. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 141, 152 (1951). The case concerned 
a petroleum concession contract allowing for exclusive rights to drill for oil in the whole of the lands, 
islands, and sea, which belong to the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. The question was whether the concession 
also extended to the area of the continental shelf? Lord Asquith’s award held that the continental shelf 
had not attained legal status as a matter of customary law at that time. 
 49. See Patrick McLoughlin, Norway, Russia on Collision Course Over Arctic Oil Drilling, 
PLATTS, May 27, 2015, http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/london/norway-russia-on-collision-
course-over-arctic-26102429 (quoting oil industry expert stating an agreement likely because too much 
is at stake; noting neither side is backing down). 
 50. Elisabeth Braw, The Tip of the Iceberg: Arctic Island Svalbard Is at a Center of a New 
Global Power Race- for Influence, and Oil, POLITICO, May 17, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/ 
svalbard-iceberg-tourism-travel-ban/. 
 51. Andrew Higgins, A Rare Arctic Land Sale Stokes Worry in Norway, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/europe/a-rare-land-sale-stirs-concerns-in-norway.html?_ 
r=0 (quoting Willy Østreng). 
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C. Coordinated Opposition to Norway 
Russia’ objection to the status quo is long-standing. Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov thought the treaty should have been “thrown in the 
trashcan” in the 1940s; that sovereignty over the southernmost island in 
the archipelago, Bear Island (Bjørnøya), more properly (that is, 
historically) belonged to Russia anyway, and that a Russo-Norwegian 
condominium should administer the remainder.
52
 
Coordinated opposition to Norway extends beyond Russia’s historical 
view, signaling that multi-party disputes are consolidating around the 
binary positions of Norway and other Arctic stakeholders:
53
 In 2004, the 
European Union (EU) delivered an ‘unprecedented and hostile’ note-
verbale demanding Norway halt enforcement policies in Svalbard’s 
waters;
54
 in 2005, Finland withdrew its support of Norway during a 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council session;
55
 Spain and Iceland have protested 
Norway’s fishing restrictions off Svalbard;56 and in 2006, Great Britain 
hosted the US, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Russia, and Spain in discussions about Svalbard’s continental 
shelf. Norway was not invited.
57
 The US once described Norway’s 
interpretation of sovereign rights off Svalbard’s continental shelf and 
superjacent water as “wishful thinking,”58 and has since 1974 steadfastly 
reserved its rights with regard to the problematic interpretation of the 
Svalbard Treaty, thus preserving its option to oppose Norway while 
keeping open strategic and economic options vis-à-vis Russia.
59
  
III. ORIGINS OF THE CURRENT DISPUTE 
The current dispute dates to 1970, one year before Norway ratified the 
United Nations Continental Shelf Convention. In that year Norway 
prescribed straight baselines around the archipelago, defining inland 
waters and territorial waters, which it asserted extended four nautical miles 
 
 
 52. See Torbjørn Pedersen, The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy, 19 DIPLOMACY & 
STATECRAFT 237 (2008) [hereinafter Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy]. 
 53. See Pedersen, CONFLICT AND ORDER, supra note 38, at 204. 
 54. See Pedersen, Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy, supra note 52, at 250. 
 55. See id. at 251. 
 56. See id. at 250. 
 57. See Torbjørn Pedersen, International Law and Politics in U.S. Policymaking: The United 
States and the Svalbard Dispute, 42 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 120, 131 (2011) [hereinafter Pedersen, 
U.S. Policymaking]. 
 58. See id. at 124 (quoting a 1974 statement by U.S. ambassador to Norway, Thomas Byrne). 
 59. See id. at 120 and 131. 
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from shore.
60
 The Svalbard Treaty confirmed that Svalbard had a maritime 
zone because it specifically mentions Svalbard’s “territorial waters.” But it 
was the only zone mentioned in the treaty. It was the only zone aside from 
‘high seas’, and perhaps historic bays,61 that existed at that time. The 
contiguous zone, the continental shelf, extended continental shelf 
assertions, exclusive fishing zones (EFZ/FPZ—Fisheries Protection 
Zones) and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) mark developments in the 
law of the sea that post-date the Svalbard Treaty. Deep divisions exist 
among parties to the treaty as to whether the treaty applies beyond the 
territorial sea.
62
 Legal opinions divide
63
 or equivocate
64
 on this question, 
but it seems the prevailing view supports the proposition that recognizes 
Norway’s sovereignty and jurisdiction in maritime areas adjacent to 
Svalbard’s territorial waters while also acknowledging the application of 
Svalbard’s non-discrimination treaty provisions.65  
A Norwegian intelligence report indicated the purpose of demarcating 
the territorial sea around Svalbard in 1970 was to lay the formal 
foundation for Norway’s long-term plan: To claim unrestricted Norwegian 
jurisdiction over the seabed from North Cape (near the northernmost tip of 
 
 
 60. See Royal Decree of 25 September 1970 concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial 
Waters of Parts of Svalbard, http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/NOR_1970_DelimitationDecree.pdf; See Anderson, supra note 44, at 373–76. 
 61. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar. Intervening), 
Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. 351, 733, ¶ 11 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda) (noting the term “historic bay” 
arose around 1910). See also Christopher R. Rossi, Jura Novit Curia? Condominium in the Gulf of 
Fonseca and the “Local Illusion” of a Pluri-State Bay, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 793, 801 (2015). 
 62. See NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT’S HIGH 
NORTH STRATEGY 17 (2006), available at https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/v 
edlegg/strategien.pdf (acknowledging disputes with Spain, Iceland, and Russia over Norway’s 
Fisheries Protection Zone and continental shelf). See also ODD GUNNAR SKAGESTAD, THE ‘HIGH 
NORTH’: AN ELASTIC CONCEPT IN NORWEGIAN ARCTIC POLICY 12 (2010) (noting various challenges 
to the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard).  
 63. Norway’s position has been supported ardently by Carl August Fleischer. See, e.g., Carl A. 
Fleischer, Norges rettigheter i 200 mils sonen ved Svalbard, in FISKEVERNSONEN VED SVALBARD 2–
24 (G. Ulfstein ed., 1983); for the opposite view, see generally Wolf, supra note 24, 2–37; ROBIN 
CHURCHILL & GEIR ULFSTEIN, MARINE MANAGEMENT IN DISPUTED AREAS: THE CASE OF THE 
BARENTS SEA (1992) (especially ch. 2). The U.S. State Department Legal Adviser once opined that the 
Treaty does provide resource rights to non-Norwegians beyond Svalbard’s territorial sea; but the 
general counsel to the U.S. Department of Defense concluded Norway’s claim was strongest. See 
Pedersen, U.S. Policymaking, supra note 57, at 129 (footnotes omitted).  
 64. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 593 (concluding it is “not possible to reach a 
clear-cut and unequivocal conclusion as to the geographical scope of the non-discriminatory right of 
all parties to the Svalbard Treaty to fish and mine in the waters around Svalbard.”).  
 65. See Wolf, supra note 24, at 18 (citing R.R. Churchill’s G. Ulfstein’s views). Denmark shifted 
toward this view in the early 1980s, when Danish fleets moved into Svalbard waters after depleting 
fishing stocks elsewhere. See Torbjørn Pedersen, Denmark’s Policies Toward the Svalbard Area, 40 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 319, 329 [hereinafter Pedersen, Denmark’s Policies]. 
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Europe) to Svalbard as well as around Svalbard except from the areas 
within the four mile limits, which would be subject to Svalbard treaty 
provisions.
66
 In 2004, to conform to the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention (UNCLOS),
67
 the territorial limit was extended from four to 
12 nautical miles.
68
 Anticipating that treaty, Norway established a 200 
nautical mile EEZ in 1976 off its mainland coast;
69
 Norway aimed at 
establishing an EEZ around Svalbard but other states objected based on 
the equal enjoyment provision of the Svalbard Treaty.
70
 Seeking “to avoid 
outright confrontation,”71 Norway chose not to press its claimed exclusive 
rights in the area.
72
 Instead, by Royal Decree in 1977, Norway 
proclaimed—“for the time being”73—a 200 mile FPZ around Svalbard to 
regulate non-Norwegian fishing vessels.
74
 Several observers interpret 
Norway’s approach as a long-range means of institutionalizing its 
management claim by minimizing “attention to conflicting interests in the 
Svalbard offshore area.”75 Access would be shared by all nationals of 
those countries that had an established record of fishing in these waters in 
a 10-year period prior to the decree
76—a framework meant to accord with 
the non-discriminatory spirit of the Svalbard Treaty.
77
  
The FPZ problematized Norway’s position, however, generating 
criticism that Norway denies Svalbard has its own continental shelf and 
 
 
 66. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 343. 
 67. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 68. Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 344. 
 69. See Act No. 91 of 17 December 1976 relating to the Economic Zone of Norway, 
DOALOS/OLA, ¶ 1, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/NOR_1976_Act.pdf; see also Anderson, supra note 44, at 376. In the first year of 
UNCLOS’ negotiation, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were quick to signal to others they would support the 
concept of a 200 nautical mile EEZ. See Rachel Tiller & Elizabeth Nyman, Having the Cake and 
Eating It Too: To Manage or Own the Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone, 60 MARINE POLICY 141, 
144 (2015). 
 70. See The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2; see also Wolf, supra note 24, at 13–14. 
 71. Tiller & Nyman, supra note 69, at 143. 
 72. See Torbjørn Pedersen, The Constrained Politics of the Svalbard Offshore Area, 32 
MARITIME POLICY 913, 916 (2008). 
 73. See id. (“for the time being”); see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Issues of International 
Law, GOVERNMENT.NO, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/dep/UD/reports-to-the-storting/ 
20042005/report_no-30_to_the_storting_2004-2005/3/id198409/ (rephrasing as “until further notice”). 
 74. Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 344. The Norwegian 
government nevertheless justified the establishment of the FPZ on the basis of UNCLOS and its grant 
to coastal states a 200 nautical mile EEZ. See Numminen, supra note 32, at 14. 
 75. Pedersen, CONFLICT AND ORDER, supra note 38, at 202 (summarizing the ‘attention cost’ 
sensitivity small-state Norway cultivates to stabilize the regime in maritime areas adjacent to 
Svalbard); see also Tiller & Nyman, supra note 69, at 143. 
 76. See Pedersen, U.S. Policymaking, supra note 57, at 127. 
 77. Pedersen, Denmark’s Policies, supra note 65, at 322–24. 
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yet claims Svalbard generates a 200 nautical mile FPZ.
78
 While Norway 
did not exclude non-nationals from fishing in the zone, it maintains the 
right to do so;
79
 in 1986 it issued cod quotas, which were extended in 1996 
to shrimp,
80
 and periodically has skirmished with non-national vessels to 
enforce its restrictions.
81
 And yet, when Norway delimited a boundary 
with Denmark in 2006, it derived basepoints using markings from the 
headlands and outermost islands of the two opposing sides, which is a 
normal means of constructing a provisional equidistance line.
82
 The 
Norwegian basepoints, however, did not lie on the mainland of Norway 
but between the nearest basepoints between Greenland and Svalbard, 
which necessarily suggested that Svalbard must have a continental shelf.
83
 
Moreover, Norway’s formulation of an application to extend the 
continental shelf north of Svalbard, in its submission to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),
84
 demarcated an area as 
“Continental Shelf beyond 200 miles”—as measured from Svalbard. “But 
if Svalbard has no continental shelf the “Continental Shelf beyond 200 
miles” would have to be delimited from the Norwegian mainland, not 
Svalbard.”85 
It appears Norway has sought to make good use of the Svalbard Treaty 
and Svalbard’s ‘lack of a continental shelf’ to emphasize issues of 
sovereignty, natural prolongation of the continental shelf from its 
mainland, and Norwegian ownership of resource exploration and 
exploitation rights in portions of the Barents Sea. But where it has been 
beneficial for Norway to rely on Svalbard’s own continental shelf—to 
 
 
 78. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 346; Churchill & 
Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 567–68; see also Numminen, supra note 32, at 12. 
 79. As implied by the language employed by the 1977 Royal Decree (for the time being); see 
Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 346. 
 80. See Wolf, supra note 24, at 23. 
 81. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 346 (discussing 
conflicts over Norway’s Fisheries Protection Zone); Numminen, supra note 32, at 13 (citing specific 
skirmishes with Spanish and Russian trawlers); Kristian Åtland & Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, When 
Security Speech Acts Misfire: Russia and the Elektron Incident, 40 SECURITY DIALOGUE 333–54 
(2009) (discussing the hot pursuit of the Russian trawler Elektron, which refused arrest for illegal 
fishing in the FPZ, and headed for Russian territorial waters with two Norwegian coast guard 
inspectors on board). In 2004, the arrest of two Spanish trawlers in Svalbard’s FPZ, prompted a suit 
settled in favor of Norway by the Norwegian Supreme Court. The applicability of the Svalbard Treaty 
was argued but not a basis for the decision, which instead, highlighted the non-discriminatory 
application of the FPZ. See Tiller & Nyman, supra note 69, at 143.  
 82. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 377. 
 83. Numminen, supra note 32, at 12 (“Svalbard cannot provide basepoints for determining an 
equidistant line if it does not have a continental shelf.”); see also Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, 
at 567. 
 84. See UNCLOS, supra note 67, art. 76 (establishing the Commission). 
 85. Numminen, supra note 32, at 12; see also Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 568. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
108 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:93 
 
 
 
 
delimit boundaries with Denmark; to present to the CLCS continental 
shelf extension considerations northward of Svalbard—it displays a 
tendency to seek control over previously unsecured resources because it is 
in an enviable position to do so.
86
 This tendency has a firm basis in the 
history of the law of the sea. It was principally framed by the great jurist, 
Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), who represented Dutch mercantile interests to 
exclude the Portuguese and Spanish from seventeenth century commercial 
trade routes to Asia all in the name of freedom of the seas (mare 
liberum).
87
 But D.H. Anderson argued Norway cannot have it both ways: 
It cannot interpret its sovereignty in an ambulatory (inter-
temporal/dynamic) way to maximize control over its land and original 
waters, but also to the extended territorial sea, the continental shelf, and 
fisheries zone, while at the same time “interpret[ing] the reference to other 
states’ rights strictly so that [their] rights were confined to the land and the 
original territorial sea.”88 It appears beneficiary countries of Norway’s 
FPZ seemingly are wanting it both ways, as well. While some reserve their 
rights to declare the Svalbard Treaty’s geographic applicability to the 
continental shelf adjacent to Svalbard’s territorial waters, and others 
dispute Norway’s claim to both the continental shelf and the FPZ, all 
benefit from Norway’s inclusion of their nationals’ fishing interests in the 
resource-rich waters within the zone
89
 and the exclusion of other national 
fleets that had no traditional fishing presence there ten years prior to 
Norway’s enclosure of that fishing zone.90 Additionally, all benefit as free-
riders as management costs are borne by Norway alone. For this reason, 
 
 
 86. On the Grotian tendency in international law, see generally Christopher R. Rossi, A 
Particular Kind of Dominium: The Grotian Tendency and the Global Commons in a Time of High 
Arctic Change, 11 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1–60 (2015). 
 87. See generally id; PETER BORSCHBERG, HUGO GROTIUS, THE PORTUGUESE AND FREE TRADE 
IN THE EAST INDIES (2010); and MARTINE JULIA VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO 
GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–
1615) (2006). 
 88. Anderson, supra note 44, at 381. If the equitable treatment provisions of the Svalbard Treaty 
were deemed to cover activity on the continental shelf of Svalbard, ancillary issues would arise 
regarding the Svalbard Treaty’s tax provision (which limits Norway’s imposition of higher taxes 
strictly to what is required for administration of the archipelago, thus serving as a boon for oil 
companies) and Mining Code (and whether its mining provision on Svalbard’s land and in territorial 
waters extends by analogy to petroleum and gas operations on the continental shelf).  
 89. The zone is particularly rich in cod, haddock, and capelin, with 25 percent of cod catches in 
the Barents Sea coming from the zone and 18 percent of Norway’s total fish catch coming from the 
Svalbard zone. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 63, at 100. 
 90. See Numminen, supra note 32, at 14–15; see also Anderson, supra note 44, at 374. 
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many of the conservation measures undertaken in the FPZ are respected,
91
 
less so its enforcement measures, however.
92
 
It appears Canada and Finland supported for a time Norway’s view that 
the treaty does not apply seaward of Svalbard’s territorial sea but these 
views have changed.
93
 Iceland and Russia vociferously dispute that claim, 
as does the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Other states 
parties to the treaty have reserved their positions or have not made them 
known publicly.
94
 Relevant international case law is modest and 
inconclusive, but portions of one case support Norway’s opponents. In the 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Greece asked the ICJ to adjudicate a 
continental shelf dispute with Turkey. Greece had made a reservation to 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction long before the continental shelf doctrine existed; the 
reservation excepted from the ICJ’s purview disputes “relating to the 
territorial status of Greece.”95 Greece attempted unsuccessfully to argue its 
reservation could not be used against it to excuse judicial review because it 
was not made in contemplation of the zone in dispute. But the Court found 
it applicable, holding that the Greece intended the reservation pertaining to 
the “territorial status of Greece” as a “generic term” that had ambulatory 
significance: “[i]ts meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the 
law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the 
law in force at any given time.”96 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein have 
argued this case parallels the Svalbard situation: If Greece’s “maritime 
rights had changed over time to include the continental shelf, so had there 
been a corresponding change in the scope of Greece’s acceptance of 
jurisdiction.”97 Likewise, if Norway’s right to sovereign claims over 
Svalbard has increased over time, “so, it can be argued, there has been a 
corresponding increase in the limitations on that sovereignty” as expressed 
 
 
 91. See Olav Achram Stokke, Kampen om rovfisket i nord [The Struggle over Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Barents Sea], AFTENPOSTEN (NOR.), Oct. 22, 2005, 
translation available at www.fni.no/doc&pfd/oss-kronikk-eng.PDF. 
 92. See generally Geir Hønneland, Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone: Legality, Legitimacy and 
Compliance, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND POLAR MARITIME DELIMITATION AND JURISDICTION 317–
36 (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Donald R. Rothwell eds., 2001); Wolf, supra note 24, at 22. There are 
some complaints that Norway has turned something of a blind eye to Russian laxity with regard to its 
reported catch. Id. at 25. Russian authorities refuse to accept Norwegian managerial sovereignty in the 
Svalbard zone and refuse to submit and sign inspection reports to the Norwegian Fisheries Directorate 
in Bergen. See Tiller & Nyman, supra note 69, at 145–46. For tabulated instances of Russian 
challenges to Norwegian sovereignty in the Svalbard FPZ, see id. at 146.  
 93. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 564–65. 
 94. See id. 565. 
 95. See supra note 23. 
 96. Id. at 32, ¶ 77.  
 97. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 26, at 578. 
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in Articles 2 and 3, the equal enjoyment and equal liberty of access 
provisions.
98
 
IV. THE MEANING OF FULL AND ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY 
The 1920 Svalbard Treaty conferred “full and absolute sovereignty” on 
Norway over Svalbard,
99
 but not in accordance with the ordinary and plain 
meaning of that phrase.
100
 Conditions attached to Norway’s sovereignty 
obligating Norwegian authorities to respect certain restrictions as the quid 
pro quo for international recognition of it rule.
101
 Fundamental to the 
treaty are the principles of non-discrimination and equal enjoyment. 
Citizens and companies from all treaty nations enjoy equally the same 
right of access to and residence in Svalbard. Rights to fish, hunt, or 
undertake any kind of maritime, industrial, mining or commercial 
enterprises on land and in the territorial waters are granted to them all on 
equal terms. While Norway is granted allowance to maintain suitable 
environmental controls, such protections must apply equally to all. All 
parties have equal liberty of access to the islands’ waters, fjords, and ports. 
Nationality accords no preferential treatment among signatories. On 
matters of international trade, the nationals of all parties to the agreement 
shall not be subject to any charge or restriction not borne by the nationals 
to whom Norway grants most favored nation status. Property rights, 
including mineral rights, are granted to all nationals of parties to the 
agreement on the basis of complete equality. Taxes collected on Svalbard 
may only benefit Svalbard, not the mainland, and the islands must remain 
demilitarized.
102
 
The curious and qualified meaning of Norway’s ‘full and absolute 
sovereignty’ over Svalbard and its territorial waters are at the heart of this 
dispute, as is the idea of limiting sovereignty over previously 
uncontemplated but newly accessible resources. ‘Qualified yet full and 
absolute sovereignty’ has the ring of an oxymoron. But surprisingly, it has 
an involved history that predates the Svalbard Treaty; the problematic 
phrase can better be understood within the context of Svalbard’s 400 year 
human history. Even in this context, a definitively clear understanding 
 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3. 
 100. See BARBARA KEMPEN, DER VÖLKERRECHTLICHE STATUS DER INSELGRUPPE SPITZBERGEN 
54–71 (1995). 
 101. See Wolf, supra note 24, at 9 (noting Norway’s sovereignty was recognized in conjunction 
with other states parties’ non-discriminatory rights ab initio). 
 102. See The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 1–9. 
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remains elusive, perhaps because states historically reaped delicate 
territorializing rewards by maintaining an artifice of temporary 
sovereignty. Svalbard’s history presents a tidal flow of equivocating 
interest in the archipelago, rising and receding with estimates of its 
economic potential. Void of an indigenous population, the region 
nevertheless bears the imprint of the human hand; commonly called a no 
man’s land, it never unequivocally embraced the meaning of a terra 
nullius, a term that escapes a single, precise, and agreed upon meaning.
103
 
The ICJ defined terra nullius as a “territory belonging to no one,”104 
where, as Peter Ørebech claims, the term’s “core characteristic is lack of 
governmental regulation.
105
 And yet states historically have proposed 
various schemes for the international administration of the archipelago 
while acknowledging that it should remain a terra nullius.
106
  
V. THE POVERTY OF COMPETING HISTORICAL NARRATIVES 
National historical traditions contribute to multiple and competing 
narratives regarding the colonization of Spitsbergen, including one 
hypothesis dating to the Stone Age.
107
 These narratives are legally 
significant. They play an important, sometimes essential, role in showing 
how title to territory has been interpreted in practice.
108
 Judges and 
arbitrators refer to them as effectivités and they seek them out where 
 
 
 103. See generally MICHAEL CONNOR, THE INVENTION OF TERRA NULLIUS: HISTORICAL AND 
LEGAL FICTIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF AUSTRALIA (2005). Blackstone, supra note 5, at 106-108, 
makes reference to “deserted” or “uncultivated” or “uninhabited” land, but never uses the term; other 
usages relate to inhabited but undeveloped land. Geoffrey Partington notes Blackstone never used the 
term terra nullius. Geoffrey Partington, Thoughts on Terra Nullius, 19 PROCEED. OF THE NINETEENTH 
CONF. OF THE SAMUEL GRIFFITH SOC’Y 96, 96 (2007), available at www.samuelgriffith.org.au/ 
papers/html/volume19/v19chap.11.html. 
 104. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 38, ¶ 79. 
 105. Ørebech, supra note 25, at 9. 
 106. See id. at 9 (noting Norway’s stance at the beginning of World War I “that Spitsbergen 
should remain a ‘no man’s land’ (terra nullius) and that the management of the archipelago should 
become international.”).  
 107. See generally Thor B. Arlov, The Discovery and Early Exploitation of Svalbard. Some 
Historiographical Notes, 22 ACTA BOREALIA 3 (2005) (discussing Svalbard’s controversial 
historiography relating to its discovery, including the possibility of a Stone Age settlement); S.E. 
Albrethsen & T.B. Arlov, The Discovery of Svalbard—A Problem Reconsidered, FENNOSCANDIA 
ARCHAEOLOGICA V, 105 (1988) (reviewing Stone Age, Viking 12th–13th century, Russian Pomor 16th 
century and Barents hypotheses); Edwin O. Okhuizen, Dutch Pre-Barents Maps and the Pomor Thesis 
about the Discovery of Spitsbergen, 22 ACTA BOREALIA 21 (2005) (surveying archaeological 
investigations favoring and disfavoring the Pomor thesis on Spitsbergen’s discovery). 
 108. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. 587; cf. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 212, 219 (Mar. 16) (separate 
opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:93 
 
 
 
 
definitive legal or historic title is lacking as they may provide concrete 
considerations leading to determinations of good title. But they cannot 
upend the status quo if good title already exists. Much is made of them 
from national perspectives to buttress competing claims of first-finder or 
first-occupier, but they can become all consuming.
109
 An arbitral panel 
once received these types of claims with indulgence, noting they may be 
voluminous in quantity but sparse in useful content.
110
 The important early 
twentieth century American legal authority, James Brown Scott, animated 
by the conquest of the North Pole in 1909, took up the terra nullius 
implications of Arctic exploration and international law, but promptly 
“disregarded” les effectivités of early (pre-modern) Arctic expeditions 
“just as the predecessors of Columbus are ordinarily passed over in 
considering the discovery of America.”111 According to Scott, they lacked 
the jarring impetus and incentive to stimulate “conflict and controversy” 
and the need for legal regulation.
112
 
A selective recourse to history, perhaps, but an observation of 
relevance to the effectivités and human history of Spitsbergen: Russian 
hunters of the high northwest (the Pomors) are said to have referred to the 
islands, which they called Grumant, since medieval times; a leading 
Russian monograph concludes Russian discovery rights to Spitsbergen are 
persuasive;
113
 the Vikings mentioned it in Icelandic sagas (the 
Landnámabók) in 1194,
114
 supporting the prevailing Norwegian theory 
that Norsemen discovered the islands;
115
 the Danes were said to frequent 
the archipelago by the 16th century, and claimed them under a mistaken 
 
 
 109. See, e.g., ROBERTO C. LAVER, THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CASE: BREAKING THE 
DEADLOCK IN THE ANGLO-ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE (2001) (detailing withering historical 
and legal disputes between Argentina and Great Britain over competing sovereignty claims to 
Falkland/Malvinas islands). 
 110. Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eri. v. Yemen), 22 R.I.A.A. 209, 268 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998). Disputed islets in the South China Sea doubtless have and will give rise to 
extensive and competing claims of historical title, the legal significance of which remains to be seen.  
 111. James Brown Scott, Arctic Exploration and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 928, 928 
(1909). 
 112. Id. at 928–29. 
 113. A leading Russian monograph concludes Russian rights to Spitsbergen are persuasive. See 
VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, 1–2. 
 114. See FRIDTJOF NANSEN, IN NORTHERN MISTS VOL. II: ARCTIC EXPLORATION IN EARLY 
TIMES 166 (Arthur G. Chater trans., 1911) (noting “Svalbaros furdr” [Svalbard discovered] “surely no 
great geographical discovery has ever been more briefly recorded in literature.”). 
 115. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 33 (1995). See also WILLY 
ØSTRENG, POLITICS IN HIGH LATITUDES: THE SVALBARD ARCHIPELAGO 2 (R.I. Christophersen, trans., 
1978). 
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identity;
116
 England asserted Sir Hugh Willougby made the discovery in 
1553 before perishing in a tempest off Norway;
117
 but most credit the 
Dutch explorer, Willem Barents, with the discovery in 1596. On a third 
voyage in search of the elusive Northeast Passage to Cathay, piloting ships 
commanded by Jacob van Heemskerk and Jan Cornelisz Rijp, Barents 
spied a land consisting only of mountains and pointed hills, and named it 
‘Spitsbergen,’118 mistaking it for a part of Greenland.119 In the early 
twentieth century, the Dutch attempted to attach priority to Barents’ name 
as the sole discoverer of Spitsbergen.
120
 Aside from conflicting historical 
narratives, Spitsbergen indisputably forms the largest island in the 
archipelago now called Svalbard, an Old Norse term meaning “cold 
coast.”121 
With Barents’ sighting, conflict and controversy followed. Henry 
Hudson, looking for the elusive Northwest Passage in service of the Dutch 
East India Company (VOC), caught sight of numerous whales off 
Spitsbergen in 1607. Buttressed by additional pod sightings in 1611, a 
robust whaling industry commenced.
122
 By the late seventeenth century, 
the Spitsbergen area hosted 200–300 whaling ships carrying upwards of 
12,000 men.
123
 The Dutch alone caught 1100 whales in 1722, but already 
the industry take probably exceeded the replenishment of stock.
124
 This 
industry first attracted Englishmen, then embittered Dutchmen, whose 
maritime interests were caught in a vice: By royal decree in 1609,
125
 
 
 
 116. Danish King Christian IV also claimed them in his capacity as King of Norway owing to the 
general sovereignty over the Northern Sea that this title bestowed. See THOR B. ARLOV, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF SVALBARD 18 (1989) [hereinafter ARLOV, SHORT HISTORY]. 
 117. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 34 (noting the claim has been 
rejected). 
 118. See generally V.F. Starkov, Russian Arctic Seafaring and the Problem of the Discovery of 
Spitsbergen, FENNOSCANDIA ARCHAEOLOGICA III, 67–72 (1986). 
 119. See MARTIN CONWAY, NO MAN’S LAND: A HISTORY OF SPITSBERGEN FROM ITS DISCOVERY 
IN 1596 TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION OF THE COUNTRY 14 (2011) [1906]. 
 120. See Elen C. Singh & Artemy A. Saguirian, The Svalbard Archipelago: The Role of Surrogate 
Negotiators, in POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 54, 61 (Oran 
R. Young & Gail Oserenko eds., 1993). 
 121. NANSEN, supra note 114, at 166. 
 122. See Louwrens Hacquebord, Frits Steenhuisen & Huib Waterbolk, English and Dutch 
Whaling Trade and Whaling Stations in Spitsbergen (Svalbard) before 1660, 15 INT’L J. MAR. HIST. 
117, 117 (2003). Apparently the earliest English whalers set sights first on herds of walruses, which 
were plentiful on the west coast of Spitsbergen. See 17th Century Whaling, History of Spitsbergen, 
http://www.spitsbergen-svalbard.com/spitsbergen-information/history/17th-century-whaling.html; see 
also CONWAY, supra note 119, at 20 (discussing commencement of walrus hunting in 1603–1604). 
 123. See ARLOV, SHORT HISTORY, supra note 116, at 25. 
 124. See id. at 32–33. 
 125. By the King, A Proclamation Touching Fishing, Westminster, May 6, 1609, James I: Volume 
45, May, June, 1609, in CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC: JAMES I, 1603–1610 507, 509 (Mary 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
114 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 15:93 
 
 
 
 
English King James I had blocked them from fishing herring off England’s 
coast; and Spain and Portugal had since 1598 blockaded Dutch access to 
the Mediterranean Sea. In response, Grotius published his famous tract on 
Mare Liberum (The Free Sea, 1609),
126
 and a year later, the Dutch 
articulated the ‘cannon shot’ rule, to reclaim control over waters 
encroached on by England. This claim reformulated a 1598 Danish decree 
establishing an exclusive two-league fishing belt around Iceland’s waters, 
owing to Denmark’s functional inability to assert broader sovereign 
interests over the Northern Sea. The Dutch claimed no sovereign could 
control more of the sea than he can command with a cannon, a distance 
from the shore of three nautical miles.
127
 The Dutch publicist, Cornelius 
van Bynkershoek, later crystallized this famous ‘cannon-shot’ rule in 
doctrinal form, establishing the territorial extension of sovereignty into the 
seas.
128
 The seafaring seventeenth century soon enough would belong to 
the Low Countries, but at the beginning of that century, excluded from the 
North and Mediterranean Seas, they had to set sail farther north in search 
of fish and a wishful passageway to eastern emporia. 
Their sea roving led to Spitsbergen, where they established an on-shore 
flensing camp at Smeerenburg (‘Blubbertown’), on the northwest tip of the 
island. The English, shortly before, had set up camp in the southwestern 
Bell Sound near Bottle Cove.
129
 At these stations and others, hunters 
harvested seal, walrus tusks, baleen, and blubber to trade with the rest of 
Europe. Baleen is the comb-like filtration system found in the upper jaw of 
baleen whales that Europeans transformed into parts for parasols, 
furniture, wagons, and corsets. At times, its price was so high, whales 
were caught exclusively to acquire it.
130
 Blubber was rendered into oil for 
lamps, lubricants for industry, tanning fats for hides, soap—and good 
money. Its most-prized and pursued supplier was the Bowhead (Right) 
 
 
Anne Everett Green ed., 1857), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-state-papers/domestic/jas1/1603-
10/pp507-523 (last visited May 13, 2015).  
 126. Grotius withheld publication of the pamphlet, the re-worked 12th chapter of a much larger, 
never published work (De Jure Praede) on the instruction of his mentor, the Land Advocate of the 
rebellious Dutch Republic, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who at that time was involved in delicate 
negotiations with Spain, which resulted in the Twelve Year Truce, easing Dutch access into the 
Mediterranean. See Rossi, supra note 86, at 20–21. 
 127. See H.S.K. Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 537, 
538–39 (1954). 
 128. See generally CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS DISSERTAIO (1702). 
 129. See Hacquebord et al., supra note 122, at 117–19; NOAA Fisheries Office of Protected 
Resources, Bowhead Whale, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/mammals/cetaceans/bowhead 
whale.htm (up to 50 cm layer of blubber). 
 130. J.N. TØNNESSEN & A.O JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING 6 (R.I. 
Christophersen trans., 1982). 
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whale,
131
 layered in up to 50 centimeters (1.6 feet) of blubber.
132
 Its 
population estimate “prior to the beginning of commercial exploration in 
the early sixteenth century was a minimum of 50,000, of which almost 
half (24,000) were in the ‘Spitsbergen stock’ of the Greenland Sea.”133 
Captain Ahab plied the nineteenth century South-Sea in vengeful pursuit 
of one Sperm whale, Moby Dick, but the novel’s author, Herman Melville 
drew real-life inspiration from the English Arctic whaleman, William 
Scoresby, who attracted fame from ventures in the Greenland Sea; his 
first-had accounts of the Arctic whale trade
134
 attained a kind of canonical 
status among mariners.
135
 Melville cited Scoresby’s accomplishments in 
his great novel’s curious 32nd chapter. There, Melville diverts the 
narrative account of the Pequod’s impending doom “to attend to a matter 
almost indispensable”—cetology.136 The book’s narrator praises Captain 
Scorseby as the supreme exemplar of the “harpooner and whaleman,” the 
“best existing authority” on the Greenland (Right) [Bowhead] whale; the 
narrator’s only criticism of Scoresby is his ignorance that “the great sperm 
whale now reigneth!,” not the “Greenland or right-whale.”137  
French sea hunters followed the Dutch to Spitsbergen, with Basque 
masters on board to school them in the craft of harpooning.
138
 
Scandinavians from the united kingdom of Denmark-Norway appeared, as 
did Germans,
139
 and a two hundred and fifty year enterprise began. This 
industry waned in the mid-seventeenth century due to the development of 
open sea flensing techniques, which contributed to over-fishing; this 
development diminished the need for terra firma whaling stations, 
 
 
 131. Called the ‘Right’ whale because it was the right whale to hunt. See NOAA Fisheries, Right 
Whales, http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/nmml/education/cetaceans/right.php. 
 132. See ARLOV, SHORT HISTORY, supra note 116, at 22. 
 133. 1 THE ARCTIC WHALING JOURNALS OF WILLIAM SCORESBY THE YOUNGER: THE VOYAGES 
OF 1811, 1812 AND 1813, xxxviii (C. Ian Jackson ed., 2003) [hereinafter SCORESBY]. Regulatory 
protections of the Bowhead whale date to the 1931 League of Nations Covenant but the Spitsbergen 
stock never recovered from whaling epoch. They currently number less than one hundred in these 
waters and remain “endangered” in this area.  
 134. See generally AN ACCOUNT OF THE ARCTIC REGIONS WITH A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF 
THE NORTHERN WHALE-FISHERY, vols. I and II (1968/1969) [1820]. 
 135. See GORDON JACKSON, BRITISH WHALING TRADE xi (2005) (concluding “any work on the 
traditional whaling trade must be deeply indebted to William Scoresby”); Sir Alister Hardy, 
Introduction, in AN ACCOUNT OF THE ARCTIC REGIONS WITH A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE 
NORTHERN WHALE-FISHERY I (1968) [1820] (citing volume I as a “classic” and “one of the most 
remarkable books in the English language” and volume II as “the finest account of Arctic whale 
fisheries ever written.”). 
 136. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK, OR, THE WHALE ch. 32, 133 (1979) [1851]. 
 137. Id. at 134. 
 138. See Philippe Henrat, French Naval Operations in Spitsbergen During Louis XIV’s Reign, 37 
ARCTIC 544, 544 (1984). 
 139. See KEMPEN, supra note 100, at 14. 
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provided more time at sea to hunt, and pushed fleets farther west into 
unadulterated waters of the Greenland Sea. By the 1870s, massive 
overexploitation
140
 and commercial substitutes for whale oil
141
 took their 
toll and ended the commercial trade. But from the moment of its discovery 
in the modern age, the history of Spitsbergen became associated with the 
exploitation of natural resources;
142
 denuded of its cetological economy, 
human interest in Spitsbergen swept away, along with the detritus left by 
flensers at the water’s edge. 
VI. THE PROTO-COMMONS AGREEMENT OF 1872 
By 1872, following a forestalled effort by a united Sweden-Norway to 
claim sovereignty,
143
 an unusual reversal of territorial temptation took 
place: Through a diplomatic exchange of notes, Russia and Sweden-
Norway declared Spitsbergen to be a terra nullius—commonly called a 
‘no man’s land’,144 thought to be valueless except to occasional Russian 
and Norwegian fur trappers,
145
 whose numbers already had diminished by 
then due to scurvy, murder, and privation.
146
 
A. A Different Kind of No Man’s Land 
But the Russo/Swedish-Norwegian Agreement of 1872 established a 
different kind of no man’s land. The agreement employed the term terra 
nullius but did not construe Spitsbergen as a landmass void of overarching 
law.
147
 Rather, the agreement—as between the two countries—
 
 
 140. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 341. Data from 
Dutch, German, and British sources suggest depredations in stock upwards of 10,000 per decade in the 
late seventeenth century. See 1 SCORESBY, supra note 133, at xxxviii. 
 141. See John R. Bockstoce & John J. Burns, Commercial Whaling in the North Pacific Sector, in 
THE BOWHEAD WHALE 563, 570 (1993) (noting negative price effect by the 1880s). 
 142. Dag Avango, Svalbard Archaeology (2005), http://www.svalbardarchaeology.org/history. 
html. 
 143. Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden in 1814 (the Treaty of Kiel) and the United Kingdoms of 
Sweden and Norway lasted until 1905, when Norway formed as its own constitutional monarchy. On 
Russia’s opposition to Sweden-Norway’s brief 1871 attempt to claim sovereignty, see KEMPEN, supra 
note 100, at 16. 
 144. See R.N. Rudmose Brown, Spitsbergen in 1914, 46 THE ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y 
(WITH THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS) 10, 15 (1915).  
 145. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 341. See also 
CONWAY, supra note 119, at 3. Norwegian fur traders first appeared in 1795. See VYLEGZHANIN & 
ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 5.  
 146. See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 4; Marek E. Jasinski, Russian Hunters on 
Svalbard and the Polar Winter, 44 ARCTIC 156, 156 (1991) (noting that Russian trappers left the 
archipelago completely around the middle of the 19th century).  
 147. VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 10. 
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consolidated their preferential rights to clarify the emerging legal status of 
Spitsbergen on behalf of the international community—a preferential 
movement toward a special kind of condominium whereby “Spit[s]bergen 
was regarded as a territory which could not be the object of exclusive 
possession by any State.”148 The binding implications of this exchange of 
notes would be revisited in the early twentieth century in line with the 
principle of pacta tertiis, which precludes the application of agreements 
against the rights of third parties absent their consent.
149
 But the 1872 
diplomatic exchanges marked an important historical first step in 
Spitsbergen’s legal development, conceptualizing it more as a res 
communis—at least in terms of subjecting its administration to common 
oversight by two self-deputized stewards—rather than as a terra nullius. 
As noted by Geir Ulfstein, “[t]he legal difference between the two 
concepts is that sovereignty over terra nullius may be acquired by 
occupation (equating the notion of terra nullius with res nullius
150
), 
whereas res communis cannot be the object of occupation.”151 Important 
Russian legal scholars support the contention that the 1872 diplomatic 
exchanges meant Spitsbergen could no longer be considered a terra 
nullius, if interpreted as a land subject to any state’s sovereign claim.152  
 
 
 148. Id. at 9 (quoting Dekanozov’s interpretation of the 1872 exchange of notes). Responding to 
Sweden-Norway’s query whether Russia would object to the former’s assertion of sovereignty over 
Spitsbergen, the Russians responded in its diplomatic note 15 of May 27, 1871 with ‘the more 
practical proposal to maintain by tacit agreement that this group of islands remain as an area accessible 
to all (“Ill nous paraîtrait dès lors plus pratique de ne point les aborder et de nous borner à la 
situation de fait maintenue jusqu’ici par un accord tacite entre les Gouvernements et qui fait 
considerer ce groupe d’îles comme un domaine indécis accessible à tous le Etats”). See ULFSTEIN, 
THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 37 n.53.  
 149. See, e.g., the perspectives added following the 1914 Conference on Spitsbergen, infra text 
accompanying notes 219–22. 
 150. Res nullius: A thing that has no owner, in which case it may be appropriated by the first 
finder. See generally F.S. Ruddy, Res Nullius and Occupation in Roman and International Law, 36 
UMKC L. REV. 274–87 (1968). 
 151. ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 37. 
 152. See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 10–11 and accompanying notes (citing 
Dekanozov, Buromenskii, and Timchenko and attributing the inaccuracy to Oreshenkov’s reading of 
Bekiashev’s PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed.) (2004)). The authors also claim the diplomatic 
exchange of notes did not renounce Russia’s historical rights to the archipelago. See id. at 10. The 
important American international law scholar and practitioner, James Brown Scott, also 
mischaracterized the conclusion of the diplomatic exchanges. See Scott, supra note 111, at 941 
(finding “the two governments agreed formally that the region should remain as it had been, no man’s 
land (terra nullius).” 
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B. The Historical Difficulty with Spitsbergen’s Common Administration: 
Contested Claims 
The proto-commons administration idea stood in opposition to the 
early seventeenth century mindset. Disputes about title to Spitsbergen 
arose almost immediately after human colonization—on land and in the 
blubber-rich western waters off Spitsbergen. English whalers “removed 
the Dutch marker set up by Barents,”153 contesting whatever implications 
of dominium it might imply. English and Dutch commanders secured an 
uneasy peace by mutually agreeing to exclusive whaling grounds in 1614, 
but the peace would not hold.
154
 Denmark-Norway dispatched warships to 
collect tribute from interloping whalers;
155
 camps were raided and 
destroyed;
156
 vessels were seized; the Dutch belligerently penetrated Bell 
Sound and in 1618 dispatched a fleet of twenty-three men-of-war to 
respond to provocation and to intimidate the English.
157
 Motivated by the 
lingering belief Spitsbergen formed part of Danish-Norwegian Greenland, 
King James I offered to purchase the islands in 1613. Failing a reply from 
the union’s King Christian IV, he claimed them for England in 1614.158 
Christian IV responded by sending warships north and intermittently 
continued to do so as late as 1643, still defending the mistaken belief that 
Spitsbergen formed part of Danish-owned Greenland. In a demonstration 
of its astonishingly rapid rise as the century’s maritime superpower, the 
United Provinces asserted military and seamanship superiority over the 
English hunting fleet in 1618, effectively securing for its fleet access to 
Spitsbergen’s whaling rewards.159  
The waning of the whaling industry gave way to a late-eighteenth to 
mid-nineteenth century period of commercial quietude—turning 
Spitsbergen into a de facto terra nullius; but twentieth century economic 
pursuits, this time mineral pursuits, brought renewed human interest in the 
archipelago. A four hundred million year succession of metamorphic 
geology layered Spitsbergen’s 15,000 meter-thick sedimentary bedrock 
 
 
 153. Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 341. 
 154. Hacquebord et al., supra note 122, at 120. 
 155. ARLOV, SHORT HISTORY, supra note 116, at 18. 
 156. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 34. 
 157. Hacquebord et al., supra note 122, at 120. 
 158. Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 341; Brown, supra note 
144, at 15 (noting England’s proxy authority to claim the land as “King James his New Land” was 
given to ships operating under the authority of the English Muscovy Company, which was created for 
trade with Russia). See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 3.  
 159. See Pedersen, Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy, supra note 38, at 341. 
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with coal.
160
 Norwegians commenced the first commercial mining 
operation in 1899 and British-Norwegian, American-Norwegian, Russian, 
Swedish, and Dutch mining towns sprouted up before World War I,
161
 
establishing a human presence that continues to this day. Svalbard’s main 
city, Longyearbyen, bears the name of the American head of the Arctic 
Coal Company, John M. Longyear, whose company, chartered in West 
Virginia,
162
 established the settlement in 1906. 
The comingling of mining nationalities soon created conflicts. But 
Spitsbergen’s location presented a strategic problem, too. Both the United 
States and Russia recognized the military importance of the archipelago.
163
 
In 1899, Russia dispatched the naval vessel Svetlana to Bear Island, the 
southernmost island of the archipelago, to counter a German presence and 
to preempt its possible claim of sovereignty.
164
 Russian foreign policy 
archivists regarded Bear Island as a station on its maritime route from the 
Baltic Sea to its Far North and to Siberia.
165
 Connecting Spitsbergen to the 
maritime route to Siberia implies its connection to the Northern Sea Route, 
the intercoastal route established to develop and extract resources from 
Russia’s High Arctic interior.166 The United States Foreign Office briefly 
entertained the thought of making Spitsbergen an American protectorate in 
1909.
167
 Establishing strategic refueling stations for far-flung naval fleets 
was a major preoccupation for maritime powers at this time and posturing 
for port access to well-placed coaling stations stimulated keen competition 
among U.S., European, and Japanese navies in Caribbean and Pacific 
waters surrounding the soon-to-be open Panama Canal.
168
 The U.S. 
Navy’s surprisingly successful use of colliers for refueling during its 
world cruise of 1907–1909, soon would lessen the importance of this 
 
 
 160. See Ole Humlum, A Geographical-Historical Outline of Svalbard, http://www.unis.no/ 
35_staff/staff_webpages/geology/ole_humlum/SvalbardOutline.htm. 
 161. See id. 
 162. ELEN C. SINGH, THE SPITSBERGEN (SVALBARD) QUESTION: UNITED STATES FOREIGN 
POLICY, 1907–1935 12 (1980). 
 163. For Russia’s view, see KEMPEN, supra note 100, at 18 (“Russland erkannte die 
militärstrategische Bedeutund des Archipels”); for the U.S. view, see infra note 168 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See ULFSTEIN, The Svalbard Treaty, supra note 19, at 38. 
 165. See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 22 (footnote omitted). 
 166. This cabotage system would play an important military role for the Soviets in World War II. 
 167. See Brown, supra note 144, at 15. 
 168. The competition was a motivation behind the August 1914 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between 
the U.S. and Nicaragua. Art. II granted the U.S. an exclusive and renewable 99 year lease on a naval 
base on islands in the Gulf of Fonseca. See generally Interoceanic Canal (Bryan-Chamorro Treaty), in 
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776–
1949 379–81 (C. Bevans ed., 1968–76). 
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imperial temptation, perhaps diverting military but not economic attention 
away from High Arctic waters.
169
 
C. The Problematic Rise of the Term Terra Nullius 
But in 1906, a non-military matter arose: Norwegian coal miners, 
employed extensively among the foreign mining companies at varying 
wages, went on strike.
170
 The strike presented Spitsbergen’s first 
dangerous development given the land’s lack of legal authority.171 At one 
point, mounting tensions prompted an English mining company to petition 
for Royal Navy support to quell labor strife at a camp called Advent 
City.
172
 Labor unrest would persist in Spitsbergen until 1920,
173
 the year 
Norway undertook to draft a Mining Code in anticipation of achieving 
sovereign rights over Spitsbergen (which it would later rename 
Svalbard).
174
  
It was specifically within this Arctic context that the problematic term 
terra nullius again came to prominence, appearing in the pages of the 
Revue générale de droit international public and in the writings of Camille 
Piccioni, James Brown Scott, Ernest Nys, and Franz Depagnet.
175
 But 
what did terra nullius mean in Spitsbergen’s twentieth century context? 
Did it preclude possession by states as a confused or commingled 
expression of res communis? Did it imply a condominium arrangement 
among interested parties? Did it require formal multilateral legal 
administration through treaty creation? Or did it express a beachcomber’s 
delight, bestowing treasures on privateers who were lucky or capable 
enough to fall first into possession of ownerless property? Each of these 
usages attached to the meaning of terra nullius in Spitsbergen’s history, 
but the term also faded from the lexicon alongside periods of 
Spitsbergen’s diminishing economic appeal, and with the return of 
Spitsbergen’s economic potential, legal views began to reformulate 
applications of the terra nullius term. 
 
 
 169. See Rossi, supra note 61, at 833–34. 
 170. See KEMPEN, supra note 100, at 17. 
 171. See id. at 17 (noting “die ersten gefärlichen Folgen”). 
 172. See ARLOV, SHORT HISTORY, supra note 116, at 58. 
 173. See id. at 58. 
 174. Treaty Relating to Svalbard art. 8, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8 (requiring Norway to undertake 
mining regulations); See ØSTRENG, supra note 115, at 16–18 (discussing the origins of the Mining 
Code). 
 175. See Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Genealogy of Terra Nullius, 38 AUSTRALIAN HISTORICAL 
STUDIES 1, 2–4 and accompanying notes (2007). 
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VII. ROBERT LANSING’S VIEW 
None of these reformulations exceeded the significance of Robert 
Lansing’s views. Lansing served as U.S. State Department Legal Advisor 
and then as U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State in World 
War I through the Paris Peace Conference. He distinguished himself as the 
leading U.S. authority on High North affairs, representing U.S. interests in 
the 1892–1893 Bering Sea Arbitration, the 1896–1897 Bering Sea Claims 
Commission, the 1903 Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, the 1910 North 
Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, and the North Atlantic Fisheries and Fur 
Seals Conferences in 1911.
176
 By 1914, he “had served on more 
international arbitrations than any other living American.”177 In 1911, he 
drafted two memoranda that helped shape the evolving discussion about 
staking claims in the ownerless land of Spitsbergen, distinguishing 
political sovereignty (“the exclusive exercise of sovereignty over 
particular persons without regard to the place of such exercise”) from 
territorial sovereignty (“the exclusive exercise of sovereignty within a 
defined special sphere”).178 His main point was that a governance regime 
presiding over a terra nullius was possible because “the right of 
sovereignty [was] not uniformly dependent upon a special sphere [i.e., a 
state] for its exercise.”179 In effect, Lansing’s view cleaved sovereignty 
from its post-Westphalian identification with the territorial state—a view 
that had antecedents in the idea of agency or divided sovereignty as 
discussed by Grotius in his Mare Liberum defense of Dutch colonial 
interests in Asia.
180
 It seems Lansing intended to articulate a variant of 
sovereignty to preside over terra nullius to protect, even temporarily, 
 
 
 176. See DANIEL M. SMITH, ROBERT LANSING AND AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1914–1917, at 1 
(vol. 59, 1958). See also U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, Biographies of the 
Secretaries of State: Robert Lansing, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/lansing-robert. 
 177. SMITH, supra note 176, at 1. 
 178. Singh & Saguirian, supra note 120, at 85 and accompanying note 58 (quoting Lansing’s 1911 
“Note: Government over persons within terra nullius—General Principles”). Lansing’s other 
memorandum was: “General Statement of Conventional Plan for Government in Spitzbergen,” which 
circulated in February 1911. See id. at 85 n.60. The distinction between political and territorial 
sovereignty extended his division between the political and territorial state, which he detailed in 1907. 
See Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 105, 109 (1907). 
 179. Singh & Saguirian, supra note 120, at 85 (quoting Lansing’s “Note: Government over 
persons within terra nullius—General Principles.”).  
 180. See generally EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, 
COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (2002) (discussing the prevalence of divisible 
sovereignty). 
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“established interests”181—a reference doubtless to extant U.S. mining 
interests in Spitsbergen. 
The subject preoccupied Lansing and he reformulated his thoughts in 
an article published in 1917 in the American Journal of International Law. 
According to Lansing’s common but somewhat misleading assessment, 
Spitsbergen fast presented ‘a unique international problem’: Overlooking 
its modern history, much as Scott did, he wrote: “No nation has ever 
considered it worth its while to occupy them or to asset sovereignty over 
them;” “[t]hus the archipelago remained unoccupied, and it became 
generally recognized that Spit[s]bergen was terra nullis, a ‘no man’s 
land.’”182 But it was ownerless property in the unusual sense that states 
were maneuvering to preclude any state’s sole title to this territory that 
nevertheless had become enmeshed in conflicting multinational private 
property disputes. If no one state could perfect its sovereign interest over 
Spitsbergen, the archipelago’s terra nullius status meant no other state 
should perfect such an interest either. More correct was Lansing’s sense of 
the Grotian tendency, at least as reflected between the whaling and mining 
epochs: “[T]he intense cold and the long period of the year when [the 
islands] are ice-bound necessarily made an attempt to develop their 
resource extremely difficult, so that they seemed to be an undesirable 
possession, a probable source of expense rather than a source of profit.”183 
He correctly noted that view changed in recent years in view of its 
possible mineral wealth.
184
  
Interestingly, even from Lansing’s ice-bound vantage point, 
Spitsbergen’s ambiguous terra nullius characterizations—evolving as they 
were—had a Polynesian analog, making his estimation of the problem, if 
‘unique’, also comparable to the issue presented for legislative solution by 
the 1856 Guano Islands Act.
185
 
VIII. GUANO 
Guano—bird droppings—was a fertilizer known for its potency due to 
the inquisitive mind of the German naturalist and explorer, Alexander von 
Humboldt. He collected a sample while sojourning in Peru, took it back to 
 
 
 181. Singh & Saguirian, supra note 120, at 85 n.59. 
 182. Robert Lansing, A Unique International Problem, 11 AM. J. INT’L L. 763, 764 (1917). 
 183. Id. at 764. 
 184. See id. at 764. 
 185. The Guano Islands Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411–19 (1856). 
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Europe in 1804, and had it chemically analyzed.
186
 Its phosphate-rich 
properties circulated in French then American and British chemical 
journals.
187
 By mid-nineteenth century, American farmers in the 
Chesapeake basin were touting its “magical influence on the soil,” 
prompting an almost insatiable demand.
188
 ‘Guano island mania’ ensued, 
sparking keen competition in British and American agriculture markets for 
the product.
189
 Its supply traced to mines long established on Peru’s three 
Chincha Islands.
190
 As its principal export and source of foreign currency, 
Peru tightly controlled its excavation, elevating its price to a quarter of the 
price of gold.
191
 A world-wide search for alternatives uncovered hundreds 
of potential repositories on islands off Mexico, in the Caribbean, and later 
on the west coast of Australia and the East Indies.
192
 But speculative 
pursuit in the crowded waters of the Americas provoked “numerous [and] 
protracted diplomatic disputes.”193 British and American prospectors 
clashed with Peruvian officials on the Lobos Islands in 1852—there, 
military threats rose to the highest diplomatic levels and the issue occupied 
several paragraphs in U.S. President Millard Fillmore’s 1852 State of the 
Union Address;
194
 Venezuela expelled Baltimore merchants from the Los 
Monjes islands; Mexico ejected foreigners from the Alacranes islands off 
the coast of Yucatan; and in the so-called Aves Affair—involving 
prospectors’ claim-jumping—the Venezuelan navy expelled both 
claimants and staked its own tenuous claim of sovereignty.
195
  Spain’s 
final gasp to restore its three hundred year empire in South America ended 
badly in a Guano war against a quadruple alliance of South American 
 
 
 186. ALEXANDER DE HUMBOLDT, PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF TRAVELS TO THE EQUINOCTIAL 
REGIONS OF THE NEW CONTINENT, DURING THE YEARS 1799–1804 xiii n* (Helen Maria Williams 
trans., 1815) (noting “the guano of the islands of Peru” as one of the substances brought from America 
and submitted to chemical analysis). 
 187. See RICHARD A. WINES, FERTILIZER IN AMERICA: FROM WASTE RECYCLING TO RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION 34–35 (1985). 
 188. Id. at 40. 
 189. See generally id. 54–70. 
 190. See Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American 
Guano Islands, 57 AM. Q. 779, 782–83 (2005); WINES, supra note 187, at 42–47. 
 191. Dan Vergano, Bird Droppings Led to U.S. Possession of Newly Protected Pacific Islands, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 28, 2014, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/09/140926-pacific-
island-guano-national-monument-history/. 
 192. See WINES, supra note 187, at 58–68. 
 193. Id. at 54. 
 194. See Millard Fillmore, United States President, State of the Union Address, Dec. 6, 1852, 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/fillmore/stateoftheunion1852.html (discussing the 
Lobos Island guano dispute with Peru). President Fillmore also noted the rapidly increasing 
commercial intercourse involving American whalemen and the Arctic Sea. Id. 
 195. See WINES, supra note 187, at 56–60. 
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Pacific coast states in 1866; and control over guano deposits in the 
Atacama Desert region, one of the world’s driest and most desolate places, 
played a major part in starting the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) between 
Bolivia/Peru and Chile.
196
  
A grander opportunity to circumvent Peru’s monopoly control over 
production arose in the expansive Pacific. Since the 1820s, American and 
British whalers had plied the waters of the central Pacific; their 
observations prompted rumors of guano islands. Speculators had 
interviewed these whalemen and had drawn up a list of islands for the U.S. 
navy to reconnoiter.
197
 The massive US Surveying and Exploration 
Expedition—a fully-equipped six-vessel flotilla of weather men, 
vegetation specialists, naturalists, cartographers, artists, scientists, and 
military men under the captaincy of Charles Wilkes,
198
 set sail between 
1838 and 1842. Wilkes’ thickly descriptive narrative of the expedition’s 
encounters, including dutifully recorded track records of the voyage, 
clearly document the expedition’s crisscrossing of many uninhabited islets 
teeming with guano deposits.
199
 Jarvis, Howland and Baker Islands on the 
equator; Kingman Reef, the 50-island Palmyra Atoll, and the Johnston 
Atoll slightly southwest of Hawaii—islands broadly falling within what 
now comprises the largest marine conservation area in the world
200— 
became the object of congressional attention. Estimates throughout the 
central Pacific were staggering: Some deposits measured as much as 150 
feet deep,
201
 inciting a Klondike-like fever among privateers, who set out 
 
 
 196. See generally BRUCE W. FARCAU, THE TEN CENTS WAR: CHILE, PERU, AND BOLIVIA IN THE 
WAR OF THE PACIFIC, 1879–1884 (2000) (discussing the Chincha Islands War between Spain and 
Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the War of the Pacific). 
 197. See WINES, supra note 187, at 61. 
 198. See id. Wilkes narrative account of his Polynesian encounters apparently inspired Melville’s 
description of the tattooed Rokovoko harpoonist, Queequeg. See Nathaniel Philbrick, The Scientific 
Legacy of the U.S. Exploring Expedition (Jan. 2004), http://www.sil.si.edu/digitalcollections/usexex/ 
learn/Philbrick.htm. Wilkes would be court-martialed and materially acquitted for a massacre that 
would take place in Fiji (Tahitians had forewarned that he should “go to your own land; this belongs to 
us and we don’t want anything to do with you.”).  
 199. See generally CHARLES WILKES, NARRATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES EXPLORING 
EXPEDITION DURING THE YEARS 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1942 (1845). Sina Najafi & Christina Duffy 
Burnett, Islands and the Law: An Interview with Christina Duffy Burnett, 38 CABINET (Summer 2010), 
http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/issues/38/najafi_burnett.php. 
 200. See Proclamation No. 9173, 79 Fed. Reg. 58,645 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.fws.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/Region_1/NWRS/Zone_1/Pacific_Remote_Islands_Marine_National_Monument/Docu
ments/Presidential%20Proclamation%209173.pdf (expanding the monument to create the largest 
marine reserve in the world). 
 201. See Matt Rosenberg, Guano Island Act, About Education, http://geography.about.com/od/ 
politicalgeography/a/guanoisland.htm. 
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to extract an estimated 12 million tons of Polynesian “white gold”202 to 
take to British and North American markets. 
With military threats and claim-jumping disputes heating up in the Gulf 
of Mexico and Caribbean, increasing demands were put on U.S. legislators 
by powerful agricultural lobbyists to secure the resource. Agriculture 
employed four-fifths of the working population in the U.S. in the early 
1850s.
203
 American warships dispatched to Baker and Jarvis islands to 
“procure guano samples.”204 U.S. Senator, William Seward, later derided 
for arranging as Secretary of State the U.S. purchase of Alaska from 
Russia, drafted legislation that would ultimately become the Guano 
Islands Act, establishing U.S. territorial control over area in the Pacific 
almost three times the size of California.
205
 Like the later Russo/Swedish-
Norway Agreement of 1872, the Guano Islands Act re-worked the concept 
of sovereignty to avoid provoking a backlash. 
The act allowed any U.S. citizen to take peaceable possession of any 
island, rock, or key not within the lawful jurisdiction of any government 
and claim it, at the discretion of the President, as appertaining to the 
U.S.
206
 The Act “virtually assigned ownership of unclaimed islands to the 
United States” and John Longyear unsuccessfully lobbied the State 
Department officials to amend the act to cover coal, thereby making it 
applicable to Spitsbergen,
207
 but Congress, sensitive to anti-imperialism 
charges at home and abroad, produced a solution that allowed the U.S. to 
territorialize its interests yet avoid criticisms of flagrant annexation that 
could provoke conflict. Certain provisions allowed the U.S. to defend 
these claims through military force,
208
 while other provisions allowed the 
 
 
 202. See WINES, supra 187, at 54; see also Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The Great Peruvian 
Guano Bonanza: Rise, Fall, and Legacy (July 13, 2011), http://www.coha.org/the-great-peruvian-
guano-bonanza-rise-fall-and-legacy/ (12 million tons); Vergano, supra note 191 (“White Gold”). 
 203. Four-fifths of Americans were employed in the cultivation of the soil in 1851. See Millard 
Filmore, United States President, State of the Union Address (Dec. 2, 1851), http://www.presidential 
rhetoric.com/historicspeeches/fillmore/stateoftheunion1851.html. 
 204. WINES, supra note 187, at 62. 
 205. See GLENNA R. SCHROEDER-LEIN AND RICHARD ZUCZEK, ANDREW JOHNSON: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL COMPANION 3 (2001) (discussing Seward’s drafting of the Guano Islands Act); 
Vergano, supra note 191 (noting the Obama Administration’s expansion of the resulting Pacific 
Remote Island Marine National Monument to cover an area three times larger than California). 
 206. See 48 U.S.C. § 1411. 
 207. SINGH, supra note 162, at 37–38. 
 208. See 48 U.S.C. § 1416, (“The President is authorized, at his discretion, to employ the land and 
naval forces of the United States to protect the rights of the discoverer or of his widow, heir, executor, 
administrator, or assigns.”). 
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U.S. to relinquish claims once the resource was removed.
209
 The 
acquisition of territory and the projection of power accompanied a 
provision to disclaim sovereignty and deny territorial dominium.
210
 Earlier 
drafts of the bill excised references to the U.S. “sovereignty,” “territory,” 
and “territorial domain,” over guano islands,211 substituting the term 
“appertaining to” which became law.  
An exhaustive analysis of the legal status of the American guano 
islands prepared by the State Department in 1931–1932 summed up 
an eighty-year history of efforts to make sense of the Guano Islands 
Act with the remark that “the only conclusion which can fairly be 
drawn from [these efforts] is that no one knew what the Guano Act 
really meant. In particular, no one understood precisely what it 
meant to say that a guano island could “be considered as 
appertaining” to the United States.212 
It meant that the US intended to protect the interests of its privateers, 
ambiguously claim title while preserving an option of disavowing 
ownership so as to not incite anti-expansionist sentiment at home or 
counter-claims from abroad. Establishing a governance regime closely 
approximating but not necessarily dependent on state sovereignty would 
later inform Lansing’s view, which conformed the concept of terra nullius 
to territorial temptation but only so long as necessary to secure parochial 
interests of nationals. This perspective expresses a recurring equivocating 
sentiment in Spitsbergen’s legal history. 
Interestingly, the problem of Caribbean guano claim jumping would 
foreshadow claim jumping in High Arctic coal mining operations.
213
 
Recognizing the improbable challenges presented by labor and territorial 
unrest in a ‘no-man’s’ land located 78 degrees North, in addition to 
crafting a governance regime divorced from the concept of statehood, 
Norway began to re-formulate ideas for a shared-sovereignty 
arrangement.
214
  
 
 
 209. 48 U.S.C. §1419, (“Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed as obliging the 
United States to retain possession of the islands, rocks, or keys, after the guano shall have been 
removed from the same.”). 
 210. See Christina Duffy Burnett, The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American 
Guano Islands, 57 AM. Q. 779, 781. 
 211. Id. at 784. 
 212. Id. at 786. 
 213. See Singh & Saguirian, supra note 120, at 64. 
 214. See KEMPEN, supra note 100, at 17 (“In dieser Situation schlug die norwegische Regierung 
vor, dass die Inselgruppe entweder von Norwegen als Mandat im Namen der interessierten Staaten 
oder aber durch sämtlichen Mächte gemeinsam verwaltet warden sollte.”). 
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IX. THE CONDOMINIUM DISCUSSIONS OF 1910, 1912, AND 1914. 
In 1910, the first of three conferences on Spitsbergen convened. 
Norway (now a constitutional monarchy), Sweden, and Russia held 
pourparlers in Christiania (renamed Oslo in 1924) and agreed on 
additional discussions to create a supreme public authority for legal and 
administrative authority in Spitsbergen.
215
 The nationality principle of 
jurisdiction emerged as a starting point for resolving conflicts or matters of 
island administration. This principle held that relative rights of persons 
residing in Spitsbergen vested in the authority nations have over their 
nationals wherever they may be found.
216
 Based on its perceived 
application, additional international conferences convened in Christiania in 
1912 and in 1914 to “frame an international administration for the 
archipelago.”217 The 1912 conference contemplated establishment of a 
joint administration agreement—a condominium arrangement —whereby 
the territory would remain neutral and open to all nations but administered 
by Sweden, Norway, and Russia.
218
 That idea was fleshed out, in terms of 
establishing an international police force, a self-financing tax structure 
based on mining claims, and explorations of scientific and environmental 
issues. Struggling still with the concepts of terra nullius and common use, 
article 1 of the draft proposal conflated these usages, holding that 
Spitsbergen should remain a terra nullius and should not be capable of 
annexation.
219
 J.H.W. Verzijl coined this provision as an ‘artificial terra 
nullius',
220
 akin to the U.S. Congress’ claim that guano islands 
‘appertained to’ but did not belong to the U.S. Other proposals were 
submitted for ratification at the 1914 conference, which added 
representatives from Germany, Belgium, U.S., Denmark, France, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands, whose nationals had established historical 
 
 
 215. See id. at 18; Ulfstein notes a draft commission proposal consisting the three conference 
attendees produced German and U.S. objections after circulation for comments. See ULFSTEIN, THE 
SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 39. 
 216. See Fred K. Nielsen, The Solution of the Spitsbergen Question, 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 232, 232–
33 (1920). See also Lansing, supra 182, at 766 (“wherever such persons may be, they are under the 
regulation of the sovereign power”).  
 217. Nielsen, supra note 216, at 232. Norway hosted all conferences in its capital. The second 
conference convened in May 1912 and included Norway, Sweden, and Russia. See Brown, supra note 
144, at 15. The third conference took place in June 1914 and was attended by representatives of 
Germany, U.S., Denmark France, Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands, Russian and Sweden. See 
Nielsen, supra note 216, at 232. 
 218. Brown, supra note 144, at 15. 
 219. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 39. 
 220. See id. at 40 n.68 (quoting volume IV of Verzijl’s International Law in Historical 
Perspective). 
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connections to the islands.
221
 There, Norway favored joint management 
among all powers doing business in Spitsbergen; Sweden favored joint 
management with Russia and Norway; the U.S. sought a veto power to 
preserve economic claims but mostly advocated in favor of Sweden’s 
position;
 222
 while Germany advocated enlargement of the administrative 
commission to include its representative, which Russia and Sweden 
opposed.
223
 It appears the composition of the administrative commission, 
and not the idea of condominium, became the major sticking point.
224
 
Willy Østreng concluded these attempts may have exacerbated 
disagreement between the discussants.
225
 There would be no resolution; 
the conference set a date for reconvening in February 1915, then adjourned 
days before the outbreak of World War I. It was the “last occasion on 
which direct negotiations took place among all of the powers most 
concerned with resolving the Spitsbergen question.”226  
X. THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
A markedly changed political landscape after World War I led to a 
“breakthrough” following the 1919 Paris Peace Conference: “The Allied 
Supreme Council granted Norway ‘full and unqualified’ sovereignty over 
Svalbard, though with provisions for international activity in the islands, 
resulting in the 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of 
Spitsbergen.”227 This extension of sovereign rights to Norway, albeit 
qualified to allow signatories the right of economic activity on an entirely 
equal footing with Norwegian nationals,
228
 marked the principal change 
and was the result of a combination of factors.
 
Twenty-seven nations attended the Paris Peace Conference but Russia 
and Germany were not invited. Russia fought with the Allies until 1917, 
but hastily withdrew from the war to attend to internecine problems caused 
 
 
 221. The third conference took place in June 1914. See Nielsen, supra note 216, at 232. 
 222. See KEMPEN, supra note 100, at 19. 
 223. See Singh & Saguirian, supra note 120, at 65. 
 224. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 41. Ulfstein reduced the main 
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by the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the separate 
and punishing 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace agreement with the Central 
Powers.
229
 Their repudiation of foreign debt owed to Allied powers and 
disclosure of secret agreements relating to postwar plans provoked the 
Allies into adopting a policy of non-recognition against the Soviet state. 
Germany, as one of the defeated Central Powers (together with Austria-
Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria), was in no position to negotiate. The 
product of the peace conference, the Treaty of Versailles, bears this point 
out. It extracted punitive measures from Germany, forcing it to cede all 
overseas possessions, ten percent of its pre-war European territory, the 
coal-rich Saarland, its Baltic Sea port of Danzig (now Gdansk), and to 
accept armament restrictions, responsibility for initiating and conducting 
the war, and massive demands for reparations. Neutral countries, such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway, technically did not 
participate at the conference, but could make their voices heard. 
A provision in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty contemplated placing Russia 
and Germany “on an equal footing” in the settlement of the Spitsbergen 
question and called on Norway to host a continuation of the conference on 
the subject.
230
 The Bolsheviks meant this provision to preserve their 
historic claim in the archipelago, but that treaty was repudiated by 
Germany’s defeat, and Norway, in view of changed circumstances, had 
moved beyond the proto-condominium idea suggested by the 1872 
diplomatic exchanges and the work product of the three Spitsbergen pre-
war conferences. This latter point weighs heavily on Russia’s collective 
legal and political memory,
231
 and may account for Russian politicians’ 
buyers’ remorse (and Rogozin’s irredentist lament232), when 
contemplating the Bolsheviks’ accession to the 1920 treaty. 
Anticipating a reward as a ‘neutral ally’,233 the Norwegian Storting’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee met in closed session shortly before the Paris 
Peace Conference and set upon a plan to acquire the islands.
234
 Norway’s 
 
 
 229. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918 ended Soviet Russia’s participation in World 
War I. See generally Peace Treaty of Brest Litovsk, available at THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon. 
law.yale.edu/20th_century/bl34.asp#art33a. 
 230. See id. art. 33. 
 231. See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 25 (noting the 1872 Agreement with 
Sweden-Norway secured “materially greater” rights for Russia). 
 232. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 233. See generally OLAV RISTE, THE NEUTRAL ALLY: NORWAY’S RELATIONS WITH BELLIGERENT 
POWERS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1965). 
 234. See ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY, supra note 19, at 41 (discussing the Storting 
Committee’s closed meeting of November 16, 1918). 
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particularly able ambassador in Paris, F. Wedel-Jarlsberg,
235
 acutely 
interested in obtaining Spitsbergen to make Norway self-sufficient in coal 
production,
236
 portaged the request to the conference’s Council of Heads 
of Delegations,
237
 where it gained traction. The Americans already may 
have been inclined toward the idea of Norway’s ownership; Robert 
Lansing, by this time promoted to US Secretary of State, had expressed 
that view privately to Norway’s Foreign Minister,238 as the State 
Department had no direct American proprietary interest to represent 
diplomatically when in 1916 all four American mining tracts were sold to 
a Norwegian banking syndicate.
239
 
And then there was the question of Norway’s war reward. Of all the 
neutrals, Norway most beneficially qualified its neutrality toward the 
Allied camp.
240
 Its pro-Entente sentiment aside, Norway had to manage a 
delicate geo-strategic situation. Despite Norway’s profitable early rewards 
as a neutral—massive foreign capital accumulation through trade with 
both belligerent camps
241—Great Britain exercised a commanding 
stranglehold over Norway’s huge merchant marine fleet, measured in 
terms of Great Britain’s world-wide control over supply lines and access 
to bunker stations.
242
 It made good use of this leverage, particularly in the 
second half of the war, which fiendishly complicated commercial transit 
through the introduction of unrestricted submarine warfare on January 9, 
1917.
243
 According to Olav Riste, the unequal belligerent control over 
Norway’s neutrality meant that Germany found advantage in the barest 
minimum of Norway’s economic concessions, “whereas the Entente was 
only satisfied with a neutrality from which a maximum of benefits could 
be derived.”244 At the war’s end, Norway was acknowledged as having 
provided “good service” to the Allied cause—committing 800 ships and 
 
 
 235. Several scholars credit Wedel-Jarlsberg’s diplomatic acumen for Norway’s acquisition of 
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Norway’s Foreign Minister Helmer Bryn expressing the view the islands should belong to Norway). 
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1,200 of its merchant mariners in support of British and French 
interests;
245
 other estimates were more exacting: Norway “suffered more 
civilian losses at sea than any other country;” about half the tonnage of its 
merchant fleet and 2,000 sailors.
246
 Adopting a more “introspective 
attitude” and a “more active foreign policy,” Norway “deliberately 
attempted to profit from the good-will with the victorious Western powers 
which Norway’s contributions during the war had created. Norwegian 
sovereignty over Svalbard, enlarging its territory by one-fifth,
247
 was the 
most notable achievement of this policy.”248  
Spitsbergen’s legal status did not preoccupy the Allied powers, but it 
was a central foreign policy focus for Norway.
249
 French Premier Georges 
Clémenceau, the host of the Paris Peace Conference, may have been 
inclined toward Norway’s position due to well establish French animus 
towards Germany, suspicions regarding Bolshevik Russia, and a desire to 
provide a reward to Norway in lieu of exciting Norwegian compensation 
claims for war-time losses to its merchant marine.
250
 A Spitsbergen 
Commission consisting of representatives from the US, France, UK, and 
Italy was appointed in July 1919 following the Versailles Treaty. 
Norwegian diplomats also were actively working behind the scene. In 
1919, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ihlen twice secured from Denmark its 
pledge recognizing Norway’s sovereignty over Spitsbergen in exchange 
for Norway’s recognition of Denmark’s claim of sovereignty over 
Greenland;
251
 the binding effect of Ihlen’s later unilateral declaration 
respecting Danish sovereignty was contested by Norway but upheld by the 
PCIJ in its famous decision on the Legal Status of Easter Greenland 
case.
252
 
The Soviets, desperate to secure international legal personality, 
dropped their opposition to the treaty, which it had protested on several 
 
 
 245. See VYLEGZHANIN & ZILANOV, supra note 12, at 22 (citing August 1919 correspondence of 
British Foreign Secretary Balfour (“good service”) and merchant marine statistics). 
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occasions,
253
 and in 1924 agreed to recognize Norway’s sovereignty over 
Svalbard in exchange for Norway’s recognition of the USSR.254  
XI. CONCLUSION 
Deep-seated resentment about the ‘condition of weakness’255 
surrounding Russia’s accession to the Svalbard Treaty frames perspectives 
of Russian foreign policy leaders from Molotov to Rogozin. Failing to 
secure its historical interests in a provision of the punishing, subsequently 
rescinded, Brest-Litovsk Pact has saddled Russia with a residual status as 
a coparcener over territory historically and psychologically regarded as 
belonging to it. The Soviets’ official news agency, Tass, once referred to 
Bear Island as a “de facto Russian island.”256 Its location at the gateway to 
the Kola Peninsula, home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, makes it 
strategically significant, as is Svalbard’s general geographic station in the 
military-strategic landscape of the High North.
257
 Sharing the island and 
indeed the archipelago with numerous NATO allies has generated deep 
suspicion in Russian political and military circles: “Russians have 
repeatedly pointed to a number of ‘dual purpose’ installations on Svalbard, 
mainly monitoring and surveillance systems, which could allegedly be 
used by the U.S. and NATO for military purposes,”258 notwithstanding the 
Svalbard Treaty’s non-militarization provision. The former Vice President 
of the European Parliament’s Northern Dimension policy labels the 
current dispute over Svalbard’s waters a “stalemate.”259 But the political 
and legal Norwegian-Russian backdrops, in addition to economic 
considerations, indicate this stalemate is potentially far more volatile than 
static.  
The dynamic, inter-temporal, interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty, 
with its preamble specifying the creation of an “equitable regime” to 
“assure . . . development and peaceful utilization,” has not been secured. 
Norway opposes this interpretation but its stratagem of avoiding outright 
confrontation while incrementally attempting to secure managerial control, 
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first in the FPZ, and now, in oil exploration blocks of Svalbard’s contested 
continental shelf, has of late generated a great deal of unwanted attention. 
The geographical reach of the Svalbard Treaty and its problematic pairing 
of Norway’s full and absolute sovereignty with states parties’ equal 
enjoyment once again are focal points of attention. Norway’s goal of 
limiting the treaty’s application to the strict textual terms of the 1920 
treaty now runs counter to the weight of political opinion, particularly the 
opinions of interested and capable states operating in the High Arctic.  
And yet these two countries—Norway and Russia—have created a 
nuanced course of dealing: Rachel Tiller and Elizabeth Nyman have noted 
that Russia has been content to cede to Norway de facto control over 
fisheries management because it is able to maintain that this control is 
illegal without having to face the consequences of a total lack of 
management that the realization of its objections would produce.
260
 
Moreover, the status quo has produced “a relatively stable regime based 
on unofficial cooperation and understanding” between Norway and Russia 
notwithstanding the ostensible objections each profess in their opposing 
management regimes:
261
 “Both are able to share the resources without 
much interference or complaint from third parties.”262 For this reason, they 
have successfully maintained the delicate “balancing act of official 
diplomatic protest and unofficial cooperation and acceptance.”263 Lotta 
Numminen agrees that Norway has been able to manage resources in the 
FPZ while avoiding major conflicts but she, like Tiller and Nyman,
264
 
predicts trouble ahead, particularly “if Norway is to open the Svalbard 
continental shelf for oil and gas exploration.”265  
Alyson Bailes argues that the Svalbard Treaty is outdated, a victim of 
the passage of time and unanticipated developments now producing 
ambiguities in its application.
266
 Similar claims have been sounded about 
UNCLOS’ perceived shortcomings and the need for a region-specific 
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Arctic treaty.
267
 Indeed, the contraposition of Norway’s claim of 
ownership over resources extending from Svalbard’s coast and other 
states’ rejoinders that they must be shared, creates ambiguities that play 
into some states’ interest to negotiate anew. But Bailes makes a good 
point: Settlement of sovereignty and ownership issues will not obviate the 
need for good governance of the Arctic. If the Arctic is trending toward 
treatment as a global commons, it will be “hard to reject global 
involvement” over matters of sustainable fishing, fisheries protection, 
nuclear pollution, and accidents.
268
  
But is the Arctic trending toward treatment as a global commons? 
Canada and Russia make mirror-image sovereign claims concerning vast 
waterways atop their respective land masses (the Northwest Passage and 
the Northern Sea Route, which forms a substantial part of the Northeast 
Passage);
269
 a “flurry of territorial claims on the Arctic seabed” have been 
presented to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, which if perfected will substantially reduce what 
formerly was regarded the Common Heritage of Mankind;
270
 in 2008, five 
circumpolar states issued the Ilulissat Declaration,
271
 which asserts their 
“unique position” to safeguard issues affecting the Arctic environment. 
Three other Arctic stakeholders—Iceland, Sweden, and Finland—were 
excluded from that meeting, and a 2010 follow up meeting in Chelsea, 
Quebec, sparking a movement to globalize Arctic issues in the newly-
formed Arctic Assembly.
272
  
A closer look at Svalbard’s history indicates that the treatment of the 
archipelago as a global commons does not precisely summarize the 
intentions of those capable states that share a propinquity to the Arctic. A 
revised Svalbard treaty with this intention in mind, however noble, does 
not seem likely absent the political will of interested parties. Instead, from 
an historical perspective, ambiguities have allowed a small number of 
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interested states access to Svalbard’s living and mineral resources while 
maintaining loosely constructed definitions of terra nullius—definitions 
that facilitate resource extraction while precluding claims of state-
sponsored ownership. A fundamental consequence (as opposed to 
purpose) of the legal regime has been to facilitate territorializing 
temptations under a ‘soft law’ (ambiguous) arrangement while 
maintaining a ‘hard law’ treaty artifice. As paradoxical as the Svalbard 
Treaty’s ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ and ‘equal enjoyment and access’ 
provisions seem, it has kept the peace and facilitated resource extraction 
through an unusual variant of the notion of divisible sovereignty. 
Corporate agents, dating certainly to the whaling epoch of the seventeenth 
century, were able to secure resources in line with state objectives. During 
the mining epoch and moving forward into the period of Norway’s 
articulation of its FPZ, overt confrontations largely have been avoided, 
although infringements are closely recorded rather than uniformly 
enforced. The fundamental objective of a Robert Lansing-type 
understanding of terra nullius was to promote parochial and extant 
economic interests involving resource extraction, which, accounted for a 
peculiar type of claim jumping: Claimants took hold of territory in the 
archipelago before overarching interests of any sovereign or condominium 
arrangement could. The proto-condominium arrangements discussed in the 
1870s and immediately preceding World War I attempted to conform the 
concept of condominium to parochial interests—and not the other way 
around—principally because no individual state was capable enough to 
secure or perfect its own economic security interest. To secure resources 
appertaining to the interests of capable states without engendering 
political risks associated with outright annexation, early twentieth century 
powers engaged in a dalliance with the idea of condominium—not for 
purposes of creating a global commons—but for purposes of securing 
temporary interests of the limited number of states by precluding access by 
others. The concept of terra nullius was constructed to afford virtually 
assigned ownership while skirting perceptions of state-based ownership by 
occupation. 
The Svalbard Treaty may have created a sovereign arrangement that no 
state party to the agreement can perfect, presenting, as Robert Lansing 
once wrote, a unique international problem. Commingling full and 
absolute sovereignty with a notion of divisible sovereignty in forms of 
equal enjoyment and access, is in fact an imperfect negation of territorial 
temptation. It provides a suitable alternative to the exercise of dominium 
by creating a virtual or artificial terra nullius that allows for resource 
exploitation and management so long as the geospatial regime remains 
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incapable of appropriation by any one state. Norway seeks at this juncture 
to end the virtual legal reality relating to Svalbard’s contested continental 
shelf. Whether Norway will be able to portage its sovereign interests to 
this geographical region (which certainly will call into question Norway’s 
Royal Decree pertaining to the FPZ as well), through its restrictive 
interpretation of the reach of the Svalbard Treaty, remains to be seen. The 
political climate suggests Norway has overplayed its hand; that it will—
for the time being—diplomatically and indefinitely delay acceptance of 
bids to open up resource exploration. But what is clear from the long 
human history of Svalbard is that the territorial temptation to secure its 
resources lurks ever so close to the resource-rich offerings of its 
continental shelf and EEZ, despite the shared sovereignty arrangement 
presented by the legal regime of the Svalbard Treaty.  
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